Rabbinical Ordination – the Ways and Means, Wherefors and Hows, History and Prehistory of סמיכה

The Requirement for סמיכה – Ordination

In negative Mitzva 194, we are told: לא תכירו פנים במשפט – Do not appoint non-expert Judges. As to what exactly is, a “non-expert” judge; that is one who has not received סמיכה – Ordination. Being ordained means that you are recognized as an “expert” judge and are so called by one who himself is an expert.

There is a fundamental rule in Jewish Jurisprudence, that Judicial Authority can only be appointed. One cannot simply self-appoint, regardless of their personal wisdom or sense of justice. Authority must be granted by a recognized sovereign or communal structure. We can derive this from the story of Moshe after he confronts the “two men quarreling”:

When Moshe was old enough, he went out to see his brethren in their slavery circumstances and found an Egyptian taskmaster beating a Jewish man. Moshe kills the Egyptian and buries him in the sand.

The next day, Moshe again goes out and finds two men quarreling. Moshe tells them:

רשע למה תכה רעיך – evil one, why do you hit your fellow.

They retort[i] to Moshe:

מי שמך לאיש שר ושופט עלינו, הלהרגני אתה אומר כאשר הרגת את המצרי – Who appointed you as a minister and judge over us; will you say to kill me, like you killed the Egyptian.

These slaves rejected Moshe’s authority, citing ‘Who appointed you’.

This challenge correctly identified that the core aspect of judicial authority – that the ability to punish a wrong doer legally, and the power to coerce someone into doing something right – is a transitive power. It cannot be granted through righteous zealotry, as Moshe had previously acted with regard to the Egyptian. It must be bestowed upon the person. And in fact, Moshe does not provide a retort to the challenge, because they were correct. Instead, Moshe acknowledges this in his statement אכן נודע הדבר – now the thing is known.[1] Moshe tacitly acknowledged that without a formal mandate from a higher authority, a person seeking to impose law and order, is acting merely as a vigilante, not a judge. True authority requires an Appointer.

This exact principal is codified in the Shulĉan Aruch[ii]. Even if a person is a מומחה – recognized expert, he is forbidden from imposing his jurisdiction coercively unless he has been formally appointed by the community or the Nasi. Wisdom alone does not grant the right to rule over others,[2] nor does being right does not grant the right to rule over others (Right does not equal Might).

The division between a Prince and Judge

It is important to note: the Torah quotes the retort issued to Moshe with two separate terms שר ושופט – a prince and judge. This is because Judicial authority is divided into two distinct categories: the executive function of the שר – prince, and the legislative function of the שופט – judge.

This division of powers was already taught to the Jewish people by Yaakov, when he was blessing his sons. The Torah states[iii]

לא יסור שבט מיהודה ומחוקק מבין רגליו – A scepter [one who rules] shall not depart from Yehuda, nor a one who hews [lawgiver] from between his feet.

The Gemara[iv] uses this verse to define the boundaries of Jewish Governmental and Judicial leadership:

שבט – This represents the executive, coercive power of the government (e.g., the ראש גלותא in Babylon). It includes the police power to subpoena, confiscate assets, and enforce rulings.
מחוקק – This represents the legislative and teaching authority (e.g., the Sages and the אב בית דין in the Land of Israel). They determine what the law is, but they rely on the שבט (or communal consensus) to enforce it.[3]

The appointment of authority

When the initial Jewish courts were established, the Jewish people were aware of the requirement to have them assigned to the position by a higher power. Accordingly, when Yisro tells Moshe how to set up the court, he notes[v]

אם את הדבר הזה תעשה וצוך אלקים ויכלת עמוד, וגם כל העם הזה על מקומו יבא בשלום – if you do this thing, and the Almighty commands you, and you will be able to sustain [this], also then all this people will come to their place in peace.

Rashi comments on this strange phrasing and provides the following commentary:

וצוך אלקים ויכלת עמוד – check with the בגבורה – Lit. the strength [Omnipotent]: if he commands you to do this, you will be able to sustain it, and if he prevents you from doing this, you will not be able to sustain it.
וגם כל העם הזה – Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the seventy (70) Elders who accompany you.

There are many questions to ask about this Rashi, but the obvious ones are: Why does Rashi identify G-d as the בגבורה – the Omnipotent. It is an unusual term for G-d. Furthermore, why does Rashi assume that Aharon, his sons, and the seventy (70) Elders are included here. As Yisro noted previously, only Moshe was acting unilaterally. Why bring in these other individuals.

And that is exactly what Yisro was saying. When he asked Moshe what he was doing, Moshe responded:

כי יבוא אלי העם לדרש אלקים – because the people are coming to me to seek the Almighty.

The people sought out Moshe who was capable of speaking to G-d as their proxy in communicating with G-d. This is not something that can be delegated, nor was it ever a situation that was repeated throughout history. However, Moshe continued his explanation:

כי יהיה להם דבר בא אלי ושפטתי … והדעתי – when they have something they come to me, and I judge them… and I teach them…

Moshe had once again taken on the authority of a judge and teacher, the שבט ומחוקק without being authorized to do so (or so Yisro thought). As an intermediary to G-d, that had been requested by the people previously, and granted by G-d, when the people couldn’t take direct communication with G-d. But as a judge, and ruler, who appointed Moshe.

Accordingly, Yisro admonished Moshe saying:

כי כבד ממך הדבר – this is too much for you.

Another way of reading this is כבד – honor, as in ‘this honor is too much for you’. The honor of being the people’s judge was not appointed to Moshe, and therefore, he had taken authority that wasn’t his.

Therefore, Yisro lays out a system of justices which can be comprised of appropriate people, who will be able to take on the burden and privilege of being the justices for the people. And he concludes – this entire plan of his depends on וצוך אלקים – the Almighty’s command. It is only when the judges are granted authority by the Ultimate Authority – the Omnipotent – that their rulings have any weight. This is (possibly) what Rashi means when he includes the other Elders in this comment – their authority, even though vetted by Moshe, would only be authoritative if Moshe obtained permission from the Almighty. Moshe’s authority could not be disputed personally, since, as a proxy to G-d, he was able to instantly ascertain G-d’s will in every scenario. However, Yisro was talking about granting that authority to a system of judges which would continue to function throughout the ages. For this reason, (possibly) Rashi notes that Yisro was asking Moshe to seek permission from הגבורה – the Omnipotent – which is the same term used in discussing the source of the Torah, as per the common idiom מפי הגבורה שמענו. Meaning, Torah Law, and the authority of the judges, must come from the same source in order to be authoritative.

This is indeed what occurred: Moshe granted the judges authority to set up the Jewish system of courts. However, interestingly, when Moshe later repeats this episode in his rebuke to the people[vi], Moshe states:

ויטב בעיני – and I approved.

Notwithstanding Rashi’s commentary explaining how this was a rebuke to the people, there is also the point that Yisro had qualified this idea as being authorized by the Almighty – וצוך אלקים ויכלת עמוד. Why then did Moshe not seek divine permission before doing so.

The answer of course is that G-d had already told this to Moshe. Previously when Moshe balked at being chosen and asked that someone else be appointed in his stead, G-d tells Moshe[vii]

ואתה תהיה לו לאלהים – and you will be the authority for him.

On this phrase, Rashi notes the word לאלהים means לרב ושר – as a Rav (Legislator)and a Prince (Executive).[4] In other words, both types of authority were already previously vested in Moshe, by the Omnipotent, prior to the Exodus. Moshe then was indeed entitled under that appointment to act as a judge [and to appoint other judges]. Presumably, in Moshe’s humility, he did not tell this to Yisro – and at the end of his life he only revealed that he had the authority to do so to express the needed rebuke to the people.

As for the idea that he should also appoint others, that already been suggested to Moshe by G-d, when he told him:

לך ואספת את זקני ישראל – Go and gather the Elders of the Jewish people.

Creating a Chain – Classical סמיכה

The means by which Moshe, the original lawgiver, who received his authority from the Omnipotent, transferred authority to the next generation of judges was through סמיכה. This process is not an empty ritual, but a prerequisite to having the authority vested in being a judge. And, this process was not a one-time thing, but rather a continuing institution that was founded with Moshe and lasted for around seventeen hundred (1,700) years, until the Romans, as we will discuss below.

As the Gemara[viii] notes; classical Ordination operates on the rule of סמוך סומך – one who was ordained may ordain. This creates an unbroken chain of tradition from the judge all the way back to Moshe in that each individual judge’s authority is considered an extension of the authority granted to him by Moshe, as passed down from ordained teacher to ordained teacher, as granted by the Omnipotent.[5]

It is only someone specifically granted this authority that is considered a judge in the fullest sense of the word, with the full scope of authority inherent in a member of the Sanhedrin. And, as the Shulĉan Aruĉ explains in the very beginning of Ĉoshen Mishpat, if one lacks that authority, one has no right to exercise specific powers granted to a judge.

Distinguishing between Jurisprudence and other forms of authority

There are other examples recorded in the Torah which would seem to be indicative of the ability to self-appoint judicial powers:

Eliyahu

If a judge is required to act as a proxy for G-d’s judgement, then there is an example of self-appointment in this role. Specifically, the example of Eliyahu. During his time as the leader of the Jewish people, the monarchy (under the evil Aĉav and Jezebel) persecuted and killed (or drove into hiding) all other real prophets, and instituted systemic worship of idolatry.

Eliyahu judged the people guilty and declared a devastating multi-year drought as a punishment. [ix] As he himself defended his actions when confronted by G-d[x], this appointment was self-appointed because Eliyahu was קנא קנאתי – I was exceedingly zealous.

While Eliyahu did indeed successfully act as a self-appointed zealot for G-d, these actions only serve to highlight the difference between a zealot (one who takes the law into his own hands) and a judge, who must issue a verdict limited to those who can be proven guilty. Eliyahu punished the entire land for the evil of the monarchy.

A zealot operates in an extra-judicial manner. In discussing the similar actions of Pinĉas, who also acted zealously for G-d, the Gemara[xi] acknowledges that while a zealot may strike in a moment of extreme crisis, the court’s official stance must be הלכה ואין מורין כן – This is the law, but we do not instruct it. A judge cannot rely on spontaneous divine inspiration or zealotry; he requires the institutional rules of procedure to validate his authoritative rulings.

When a zealot does not stand up and strike down the offender, the courts still are not empowered to act. This matter becomes a matter for heaven, as the verse[xii] states יכרת ה’ לאיש אשר יעשנה – G-d shall cut of the man who does this. Accordingly, G-d eventually stepped in and cut short the drought, replacing that punishment with a heavenly mandated one.

The Command to Appoint Judges

The Torah tells us[xiii] that we are commanded to appoint judges – שופטים ושוטרים תתן לך. Based on the use of the singular תתן לך, one could argue that the verse describes the ability to self-appoint a judge, as the word לך is often interpreted as for yourself, as in the famous command to Avraham: לך לך – Go for yourself. This would seem to indicate that people have the capacity to appoint those they wish as their judges and police. Irrespective of whether the individual has received ordination or not.

Indeed, there is the concept in Halaĉa which includes the idea of self-appointment. This can be found in several Halaĉos:

The Expert Justice

A מומחה – an expert can be appointed as a single-panel justice to adjudicate matters between litigants, IF the litigants both agree to accept the ruling of the Expert. If the litigants voluntarily approach the Expert seeking his counsel, he is permitted to judge their specific case based on his own innate wisdom and expertise and need not seek counsel with other judges to form the panel of a court.

The Biased Justice

Additionally, this concept is in use when there is no standing court for the litigants to approach. In such a situation (and in other situations, which details can be found in Shulĉan Aruĉ) the litigants each choose an individual as their representative on the panel of judges adjudicating the case. These two (2) chosen judges then come together and appoint a third judge who can join them on their panel. This process is called the ZABLA process: זה בורר לו אחד (זבל”א) וזה בורר לו אחד – this one chooses one for himself, and this one chooses one for himself. Although all judges are commanded to be impartial, the very act of being chosen by only one of the litigants imparts an inherent bias toward that litigant. This bias though is hopefully balanced out by the bias of the other chosen justice, as well as the impartiality of the third justice who will be the deciding vote in the case.

This would seem to indicate that it is possible to self-appoint a judge.

However, the verse continues: ושפטו את העם – and they will judge the people. The verse is speaking in the singular to the entire nation, not to the individual, and therefore continues by switching to the third-person ‘the people’ instead of saying ושפטו אותך – and they will judge you. This ability to self-appoint is limited to the very case in which they are self-appointed. This panel has no ability to judge the general populace – which would include the coercive power to issue subpoenas and seize assets. Instead, the singular תתן לך is understood by the Gemara[xiv] as a command directed at the collective entity of the Jewish people. An individual can be wise, and in individual cases can be appointed to act on that wisdom, but they cannot self-generate the court’s coercive power; that power must be handed to them by the community.

Yehoshua

Yehoshua would seem to be the strongest example of the ability to self-appoint a judge. As indeed, the ordination of Yehoshua in many respects is the source for how we know the various aspects of ordination. However, on its own, the example of the ordination of Yehoshua is not enough to teach us the rules and limits of ordination. Yehoshua was the exception as well as the precedent.

The appointment of Yehoshua was the result of a specific divine command, as the verse[xv] states קח את יהושע – Take Yehoshua. This verse was told to Moshe in response to Moshe’s demand that a leader be appointed to replace Moshe himself, so that the people should not be left כצאן אשר אין להם רועה – like sheep who have no shepherd.

The reason we know this one-time command is not the precedent setting example is because, this action occurred outside of the land of Israel. סמיכה can only occur within the land of Israel (as we will discuss below). Had this been the sole precedent upon which all other ordinations are based, we would be able to initiate סמיכה outside the borders of Israel. However, since this was only a one-time command, it cannot form the source for a generational rule, unless the command includes a reference that this is a precedent setting example.

Furthermore, the appointment of Yehoshua was not limited to a judicial appointment. Yehoshua was also appointed as the Leader of the Jewish people. The Halaĉa treated Yehoshua as an anointed king, as we find discussed in the Gemara[xvi] that rebelling against Yehoshua carried the death penalty, similar to the punishment for rebelling against a king. This was also accepted by the people, as we find in the conversation between Yehoshua and the warriors from the tribes of Reuvain and Gad[xvii] כל אשר ימרה את פיך ולא ישמע את דבריך לכל אשר תצונו יומת, רק חזק ואמץ – any who rebel against you and does not listed to your statements in all that you shall command them – shall die. Just be strong and resolute.

And finally, the appointment of Yehoshua contained a spiritual significance that was not self-perpetuating. The Midrash, quoted in the Gemara[xviii] notes that by means of this ordination, the literal “placing of hands” by Moshe on Yehoshua transferred some of the spiritual power inherent in Moshe to Yehoshua, so that ‘the face of Moshe was like the sun, and the face of Yehoshua was like the moon’. We do not find this concept of glowing faces repeated in any further cases of ordination.[6]

The Source for the Geographical Imperative

In the matter of Ordination being limited to the geographic boundaries of the Land of Israel, I was not able to find an ultimate source for this component in the Torah. Nor is it clear to me from within the Gemara as to the reasoning behind this.

Rabbi Yehoshua son of Levi said[xix], “there is no ordination outside the land of Israel.”

The Gemara analyzes this statement with a historical anecdote: Rabbi Yoĉanan was distressed that his student, Rav Shamen bar Abba, was permanently living in Babylon, which prevented him from ordaining him.

The very fact that this statement by Rabbi Yehoshua son of Levi is not analyzed or discussed, indicates that the Gemara accepts this statement as axiomatic. And indeed, Rambam[xx] rules that if either party is outside the Land of Israel, one cannot initiate סמיכה.

Exception to the Geographical Rule

The Yerushalmi[xxi] notes the following discussion:

Rabbi Imi asked Rabbi Simon, “I heard that we appoint Elders outside the Land of Israel.”

Response: He [Rabbi Simon] said to him [Rabbi Imi], “I heard that we do not appoint Elders outside the Land of Israel.”

The Yerushalmi thus sets forth that the criteria concerning whether one is allowed or not allowed to appoint Elders [initiate Ordination] outside the Land of Israel is a matter of the Oral Tradition. Rabbi Imi had received the tradition that this was permitted, while Rabbi Simon had received the opposite tradition.

Clarification: Rabbi Levi said, “This is an explicit verse[xxii] בן אדם בית ישראל יושבים על אדמתם – Son of Man, the House of Yisroel is dwelling on their Land. Your ישיבה [the Talmudic studying required in order to be ordained] should only occur while on your Land.”

The Rabbis of Caesarea said, “We do appoint Elers outsider of the Land of Israel, on condition that they return.”

Case Studies:

Rabbi Yitzĉok son of Naĉman was in Azza[7], and he was appointed on condition he return.
Rabbi Z’mina was in Tzor[8], and he was appointed on condition he return.
Also, Rabbi Yona was on the list, but he did not accept the appointment. He stated, [he would not accept the appointment] until time his teacher [Rabbi Ze’ira] was appointed. And they appointed his teacher.
Rabbi Ĉama said, Yehuda son of Titus was in Rome, and he was appointed on condition he return.

While there is room to argue that both Tyre and Azza should be considered part of the Biblical apportionment of the Land of Israel, Rome certainly is not. Therefore, we must conclude that there is a Halaĉic caveat of some kind allowing an appointment of Elder’s who are outside the Land of Israel, on the condition that they return.

Rambam though completely and explicitly disallows this. He states unequivocally that neither party can be outside the Land of Israel. They do not need to be within the same location, but they do need to both be present on the actual Land of Israel. Normally, when there is an argument between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi, the codifiers, for various reasons, establish the Halaĉa in accordance with the Bavli. Here though, the argument is not a conceptual one. Rather, it is an argument of existence. Did Semicha occur to the four (or perhaps five) Elders identified in the Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi states it did. The Rambam states it could not have.

To resolve this, I believe that we must distinguish between the various types of Ordination. The Gemara[xxiii] discusses three different tiers of appointments:

יורה יורה – May he instruct? He may instruct. This is the granting of the authority to rule on specific matters, including matters of Jewish daily life, Kosher, and Shabbos [and the holidays]. In other words, this type of Ordination is for the day-to-day living of a typical Jew.
ידין ידין – May he judge? He may judge. This is a more advanced type of authority empowering the individual to sit on a Rabbinic court, and rule on civil [including community affairs and conversion], monetary and marital [marriage, divorce, Ĉalitza and Yibum] laws. During our exile, this type of ordination is typically limited to business matters, requiring additional, more specific ordinations, for each criterion in which the individual is authorized to participate in a panel of judges.
יתיר יתיר – May he permit? He may permit. This is a specific authority granted to experts in biology and animal husbandry who are competent to determine if a firstborn animal is permitted or restricted – due to its firstborn status.

There are in fact many other types of authorization. Among those practiced during exile include: the authorization to be a scribe, a slaughterer of kosher meat, a Mohel, and a Wise person who is capable of nullifying vows. In the days of the Base Hamikdash, there were additional authorizations, including, for example: the ability to determine if a person was afflicted with Tzara’as.

Since there are other types of Ordination, why does the Gemara limit its discussion to these three types alone? I believe the answer is because these three types are all archetypes. They are the general categories of three different types of Ordination. In reverse order, these categories are:

יתיר יתיר – Expert status in a particular field. This status wasn’t necessarily tied to Halaĉic knowledge. A truly knowledgeable biologist / farmer would theoretically be qualified to fulfill this role. He simply needed to learn the definitions of the various criteria to consider and then apply those definitions to the matter at hand. Was the animal lame, for example. This type of knowledge need not be achieved in a formal Yeshiva environment. This is referring to an expert by virtue of his expertise.[9] The מומחה.[10]
ידין ידין – Ordained Elder. This type of ordination original included legal authority to set the Rabbinic enactments, initiate punishments for violating a Mitzva, impose the death penalty etc. All the members of the Sanhedrin would be included in this category as well as the members of the lesser courts. The מחוקק.
יורה יורה – Appointed Rabbi. This was the one who is a מורה הוראה – a teacher and leader of the community. The שבט.

In the Yerushalmi, the sages there speak specifically of ordaining an Elder. One who fits into the middle category, authorized to sit on a court, and apply punishments. Such ordination can only occur within the Land of Israel, hence the caveat that all of those case-studies were ordained on condition that they return. Presumably, at the point of return, that ordination took effect, at that point making them ידין ידין.

However, this leaves us with the difficulty of the Rambam’s ruling. If there is an open caveat allowing an ordained Elder in the Land of Israel to ordain the next Elder, who is not currently in the Land of Israel, why would the Rambam not include that caveat. Furthermore, we are left with the problem of Rabbi Yoĉanan being distressed that his student, Rav Shamen bar Abba, was not in the Land of Israel. Why wouldn’t Rabbi Yoĉanan simply issue the appointment, on condition that Rav Shamen bar Abba return.

We must therefore say that there is another component / category of Semicha which does not allow for a conditional appointment. Namely, the category of יורה יורה. The appointment of a leader who teaches, a מורה הוראה, is part of the Chain of סמיכה going back to Moshe’s leaning his hands on Yehoshua. That type of Ordination, setting up a person as the leader of his people, can only happen within the Land of Israel. Granted, we are told in the Mishna[xxiv] עשה לך רב – make for yourself a Rav, which implies that even when there are no ordained Rabbi’s we should make one – in other words, a leader is accepted by the people and not appointed by a higher up. Nevertheless, a Rabbi which was ordained under the authority of the chain of tradition, is very different than one who is merely accepted by the community.

This difference is illustrated in the Yerushalmi[xxv]. The Yerushalmi tells us that Ĉananya wanted to set up a court which could intercalate the Jewish calendar. The Elders from Yerushalayim sent him a message quoting the verse[xxvi] כי מציון תצא תורה, ודבר ה’ מירושלים. Certain aspects of legal authority cannot be appointed outside of the Land of Israel. Even if one was an ordained Elder, like Ĉananya, and a מומחה in intercalation calculations, he still cannot access this aspect of סמיכה. The סמיכה of יורה יורה, which is a prerequisite for the full power and authority of the appointment to ידין ידין can only be granted in the Land of Israel by one who himself received סמיכה, while in the Land of Israel, while they are both in the Land of Israel. It is this type of סמיכה that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi issues his statement about, and it is this which the Rambam codified.

One the person had received proper סמיכה from within the Land of Israel, by a person who himself received סמיכה within the Land of Israel – in other words, one who already has the status of יורה יורה – such a person can receive the next degree of Ordination while he is outside the Land of Israel: CONDITIONAL on his return to the Land of Israel. Because, the status of ידין ידין, when exercised by a מוסמך is only possible when he serves on a panel of judges – and the very act of serving on that panel is the true granting of the סמיכה of ידין ידין.

That there is a difference in the types of סמיכה granted is already specified by the Gemara which lists out the types of סמיכה. Lest one say that there is really only a single type of סמיכה and that the Gemara’s list is a differentiation of category, and not quality, we have the following qualitative difference. The סמיכה to the position of יורה יורה can be initiated by a single qualified individual. However, as the Rambam notes[xxvii], the סמיכה to the position of ידין ידין must be done by a panel of three (3), a mini court. Only a court can grant an individual the right to sit on a court.

On the other hand, for specific topics, a single person who had previously received סמיכה can in turn grant others that power to teach and guide others – יורה יורה in those specific topics.[xxviii]

Originally, the סמיכה to the position of ידין ידין was done by any three (3) Elders. However, as the Rambam notes[xxix], the sages in the times of the early Mishna decided to honor the House of Hillel the Elder[11] by requiring all further Justices to be ordained by permission of the נשיא – who himself was a descendant of the House of Hillel. And that only the נשיא or the אב בית דין could together ordain a judge without a third individual joining the panel.

This still leaves us with the question of why the Rambam didn’t include this historical caveat – which is a question to which I have no answer.

The Spirit Transference

The Sifri[xxx] notes that this original סמיכה was not merely an approbation, recognizing an individual’s intellectual achievements in studying the underlying laws, and comprehending their application. Rather, this סמיכה contained within it an aspect of the transference of the Divine Presence, which would rest on the individual thus ordained.

It is for this reason that it is impossible to confer סמיכה, regardless of an individual’s personal achievements and intellectual capacity, on anyone outside of the Land of Israel – because, the Divine Presence does not rest in the rest of the world in the degree it does within the Land of Israel.

This concept is further explored by the Gemara[xxxi] which discusses the term[12] אלקים found in the verse[xxxii] ונקרב בעל הבית את האלקים, a verse which refers to a person going to court. The Gemara there draws a connection between the full operations of the court, and the requirement for the Yovel – so long as the Yovel is in force, then the judge can hold the title of אלקים – divine authority, as the judge is acting as G-d’s proxy in enforcing G-dly laws. As we know from the laws of Yovel[xxxiii] the ability to enforce the Yovel depends on the Jewish people being fully present within the Land of Israel. In other words, the true authority of a Jewish judge is irrevocably tethered to the Land of Israel.

The Bubble of Authority

As to how far that authority goes; if a judge’s authority is tied to the Land of Israel, does this mean that he has no authority over those living outside the Land of Israel. The Gemara[xxxiv] discusses this, based on the verse[xxxv] שופטים ושוטרים תתן לך בכל שעריך and concludes that a properly Ordained judge’s authority does indeed extend to those outside the Land of Israel. Furthermore, we are commanded to appoint properly Ordained judges to rule there. [Although the Gemara does qualify this by noting that the prevalence of judges need not be as ubiquitous outside the Land of Israel, as they are to be within the Land of Israel.]

Furthermore, the division of Judges is to be appointed within and across tribal lines[13], ensuring that all the Jewish people have representatives in the Justice system. To reiterate though, that appointment radiates out from the Land of Israel, by sending judges who have been already ordained within the Land of Israel, to these outside communities.

In Summary

The Original סמיכה

סמיכה functions as a chain of ordination stretching back to Moshe, which grants authority and bestows the divine presence on the recipient. This constitutes the level of יורה יורה – the individual is granted the Rabbinical authority (the שבט) to teach the people he is assigned to and guide them in their service to G-d. Individuals who were ordained with יורה יורה could also be appointed as Justices of the Court, to legislate the Jewish people (the מחוקק), and adjudicate punishment as part of the Sanhedrin and similar bodies. Finally, there were those subject matter experts (the מומחה), who were not necessarily ordained with סמיכה, but who were recognized for their knowledge and able to opine within their subject matter.

After the Chain was Shattered

With the Chain of סמיכה broken, the Rabbinical authority was diminished. Instead of being an extension of the divine authority granted to Moshe, now it is an extension of the people’s acceptance that an individual has the knowledge and innate qualities to lead them.[14] Judges are no longer legislators of the law, but Officers of the Court – proxies whose power exist in enforcing (to a limited extent) what the courts have already ruled on.

As the judges are now only Officers of the Court, this creates an unusual situation. The Torah[xxxvi] provides a means of rectifying mistakes made by the supreme court[xxxvii], when a person acts in accordance with an improper ruling. However, when it comes to the Officers of the Court who err in their rulings, since they are not Ordained Justices and only act as proxies of the court system authority, there is a liability shield inherent in what rulings they issue.[xxxviii] It is only when an Officer of the Court is טעה בדבר משנה – mistaken in (something well known like) a Mishna that his rulings have no weight, and he himself can be held responsible for making such an obvious mistake[xxxix], and that one has the right[xl] to ignore that ruling and seek out different Officers of the Court who will issue the proper ruling.

In other words, Officers of the Court are granted permission to teach (התרת הוראה) that which was already ruled, while those who had received סמיכה are empowered to legislate and interpret the law on their own.

All this started from the time of the Romans when they initially attempted to kill off the religious leaders of the people, and when that didn’t work, the Byzantines attempted to drive out the people from the Land.

The Roman (successful) Attempt to Destroy the Chain

The Gemara[xli] tells us of the brutality of the Roman’s, and their efforts to destroy the Jewish people. They didn’t just attempt to kill the Jews in the land of Israel, they also attempted to destroy Judaism. One of the means they chose to do so was to ban the practice of Ordination. The Roman’s recognized the true power of the ordained Rabbi’s in that they were those vested with Torah authority, and they believed that if they were to succeed in destroying Judaism, it would only be through the destruction of סמיכה. Accordingly, they adopted a ‘scorched earth’ policy in relation to Ordination – not just would those ordained and the one issuing the ordination be killed, but the entire city in which this took place would be razed and its people killed.

Rabbi Yehuda son of Bava decided to defy the Romans. To prevent any collateral damage to the cities nearby, he and his students went to an area between two cities, Usha and Shefam[15], and there he ordained five sages: Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda bar Ila’I, Rabbi Yosi ben Ĉalafta, Rabbi Shimon bar Yoĉai, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamu’a.

Doing so was a capital crime in Roman era Israel, and the Roman soldiers indeed came, and threw three hundred javelins at Rabbi Yehuda son of Bava killing him. When the Romans were coming, Rabbi Yehuda son of Bava said to his students “My sons, flee!” They responded, “Rabbi, what will become of you?” He answered, “I am placed before them like a boulder which cannot be overturned.” His students indeed escaped, at least for a while.

While the sacrifice of Rabbi Yehuda son of Bava was successful in defying the Roman persecution and preserving the chain of סמיכה. For example, Rabbi Ze’ira who lived many centuries later[16], is described[xlii] as hiding so that he wouldn’t be granted ordination. Similarly, the Gemara records the song that was sung when Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi[17] were ordained. Ultimately though, the (Byzantine) Roman’s succeeded in abolishing the practice, by the simple expedient of driving all the people out from the land of Israel. סמיכה can only be performed within the land of Israel. By driving all sages out of the land, this in effect prevented them from continuing the tradition. Eventually, with the shift of the Jewish centers of learning to Babylon, the chain was broken and סמיכה, along with the authority granted by G-d through that chain, was broken leaving us with no judges whose authority is granted by a higher power.

With the chain broken how will the Sanhedrin, with the powers inherent in them, ever be reconstituted. The Rambam[xliii] offers the following suggestion:

נראים לי הדברים: שאם הסכימו כל החכמים שבארץ ישראל למנות דינין ולסמך אותן – הרי אלו סמוכין, ויש להן לדון דיני קנסות, ויש להן לסמך אחרים.

אם כן למה היו החכמים מצטערין על הסמיכה כדי שלא יבטלו דיני קנסות מישראל?

לפי שישראל מפזרין ואי אפשר שיסכימו כלן.

ואם היה שם סמוך מפי סמוך, אינו צריך דעת כלן, אלא דן דיני קנסות לכל, שהרי נסמך מפי בית דין.

והדבר צריך הכרע.

The following appears to me [the Rambam]: that if all the sages who are in the Land of Israel agree to appoint judges and ordain them, they are Ordained. And they [would] have the power to adjudicate the Laws of Penalties, and they may Ordain others.

If so, why would the Sages pained about ordination in that the Laws of Penalties should not be voided amongst the Jewish people?

Because, the Jewish people are spread out, and it is impossible[18] for them to all agree.

And if there was a person Ordained from one who himself was Ordained, he would not need the knowledge [consent] of all of them, but may adjudicate the Laws of Penalties to all, since he has been Ordained from a court.

This thing requires resolution.

The Spanish Catalyst

Following the Spanish Expulsion of 1492, thousands of Jews were forcibly converted to Christianity (becoming Conversos or Marranos). Decades later, many managed to escape to the temporary and relative safety of the Ottoman Empire (including the Land of Israel) and wished to return to Judaism.

These returnees were terrified. Under Jewish law, practicing idolatry or violating Shabbos (even under varying degrees of duress) carries the severe spiritual penalty of כרת – cutting off the soul / death by heavenly decree. However, there was a Halaĉic solution. The Gemara[xliv] states, ‘all those who are liable for כרת who are given (by the earthly courts) the punishment of מלקות – lashes are exempt from the punishment of כרת. In other words, if these people could be punished by the earthly court, they would no longer be punishable by the heavenly courts. And, in their mind, temporary physical suffering was far preferable than having their soul cut off by G-d.

The problem was, only Ordained Judges can form a proper Jewish Court of Law, empowered to administer corporal punishment to individuals who violate a Mitzvah. The Rabbis of the time had not received סמיכה, nor had anyone received it for nearly a thousand years – since the end of the era of the Gemara.

The Synod of Tzefas

To solve this problem, a local Rabbi, Rabbi Yaakov Beirav, the Chief Rabbi of the city of Tzefas, decided to attempt the loophole proposed by the Rambam. If he could succeed in restoring סמיכה, as suggested by the Rambam, he could convene a proper Jewish Court of Law, and issue corporal punishments to the individuals who had been forced by the Spanish to violate Torah Law, thus rendering void any prospective heavenly decrees.

He assembled a Synod of the twenty-five leading Rabbis of the city of Tzefas and put forth this solution to them. The Synod agreed with his approach and unanimously voted to ordain Rabbi Beirav as the first Ordained Justice of the new order. Rabbi Beirav immediately ordained his four greatest students, among them, Rabbi Yosef Cairo, future author[19] of the Shulĉan Aruĉ.

Furthermore, Rabbi Beirav also ordained his leading opponent, Rabbi Levi Ibn Habib from Yerushalayim – attempting to illustrate that the Ordination was valid, and that he would use this power only for the good of the people. Rabbi Levi Ibn Habib was not impressed, and he launched a massive counter argument against this new institution. His argument relied on several points that Rabbi Beirav had ignored in setting up his Synod:

The Rambam’s Loophole was not a Halaĉic ruling, but a theoretical argument. As the Rambam himself stated והדבר צריך הכרע – this idea needed to be determined before being implemented.
The initiation of such a monumental upheaval to Judaism could not bypass Yerushalayim, as the sages who countered Ĉananya who wanted to reinstitute the calendric intercalation told him – כי מציון תצא תורה ודבר ה’ מירושלים. Without the inclusion of the Rabbis from Yerushalayim, such a project could not be authorized. Furthermore, even though Tzefas had a larger Jewish population at the time[20], and thus could be viewed as a population capital, it was Yerushalayim which had spiritual primacy, being the seat of the Sanhedrin.[21]
Forcing this issue would bring about a catastrophic schism within Jewish law. Some courts, believing themselves ordained, would issue corporal punishment to wrong doers. While other courts, believing those courts to be un-ordained, would view the corporal punishment as assault and punish the courts for physical abuse of a fellow Jew.

The attempt by Rabbi Beirav failed, possibly because, unlike the Rambam’s proposition, Rabbi Beirav failed to secure agreement from ALL the sages within the Land of Israel. The arguments and counter arguments turned personal and vindictive. His attempt was presented to the Ottoman government as the start of a rebellion in reinstating Jewish autonomy within the Land of Israel, and the Ottomans were happy to take the excuse to move against him (Rabbi Beirav was wealthy) and he had to flee to Egypt. Within three generations, this new chain was left to fade away as the Halaĉic world sided with Rabbi Levi Ibn Habib.

The Rambam’s Loophole

Since, as we noted previously, true סמיכה includes the spiritual aspect of the installation of the divine presence within the ordained individual, not to mention the prosaic concept of tracing one’s Rabbinic lineage and authority back to Moshe, how could the Rambam come to the conclusion that the institution of סמיכה could be reinstituted.

One possibility is that the statement of the Gemara, that the Sanhedrin would be reinstated in Teverya,[22] constitutes a quasi-prophecy. Thus, if the reinstatement were to succeed, that would be the fulfillment of the prophecy and proof that the divine presence was reinserted into those being ordained. In other words, the divine presence is not a mechanical contrivance, but the reflection of the Divine Will operating as a proxy through the members of the Sanhedrin. If, by Divine Providence, the Sanhedrin could be reinstituted[23], after being dismantled by Divine Providence, then that would be an indication of the return of the Divine Presence. In other words, the reconstitution does not create the new סמיכה chain, it is a reflection of it.

In which case, Rabbi Ibn Habib was absolutely right. Since he didn’t agree, that means the Divine Presence had not been restored, and the actions of Rabbi Beirav were mere hubris.

Another possibility is, as we mentioned earlier, at the core of establishing a system of Justice – which an Ordained Judge is authorized to legislate is מי שמך – who appointed you. Regardless of whether or not the Divine Presence is restored within the Ordained individual, if they were to be accepted by ALL the sages within the Land of Israel, that would constitute sufficient authority to grant that individual ultimate legislative power. The question of “Who appointed you” would thus be answerable: “Everyone appointed me”.

In other words, the authority vested is not necessarily dependent on the Divine Presence resting on the individual. In fact, the heavenly court would bow to the rulings of such a person. We find examples and precedence to this concept – that the heavenly court follows the rulings of the earthly court in several points of Jewish Law, most notably, the idea that it is the earthly court which establishes the start of the new month, and the insertion of an additional month of Adar when needed.[xlv]

Finally, there is the possibility that the authority granted in the Ordained individual is derived from the community similar to the authority granted in a sovereign. Authority comes from the acceptance of the people

We find with the crowning of King Shaul, the first of the Jewish kings, that there was a need to appoint him with the consensus of the entire people. Even though Shmuel had, as G-d’s proxy and as the recognized leader of the Jewish people, appointed Shaul previously and privately as the ruler over the Jewish people[xlvi] nevertheless, Shmuel felt the need to call forth the entire people ונחדש שם המלוכה – to create a new monarchy there (at the site of the Mishkan).[xlvii]

Similarly, the initial courts’ authority must be accepted by the people before they can render the Laws of Punishment.

Further Comparisons between Monarchy and Judgeship

Once authority is vested, it can be transferred to the next in line

A monarchy operates by succession. When one king passes away, the next king in line immediately steps in to take his place. Furthermore, although the monarchy is hereditary, it is also a meritocracy. When one prince apparent is unsuited to take over the kingship, we do not wait for the next generation. Instead, sovereignty is transferred to the next appropriate individual in the line of succession. We find the example of this with the appointment of King Shlomo to inherit King Dovid, rather than Prince Avshalom – even though Avshalom had the backing of various important people, he was not judged worthy by King Dovid, and therefore King Dovid abdicated early in order to ensure that the proper and righteous Prince Shlomo would inherit the monarchy while Dovid was still alive, and thus a severe War of Succession was averted.

Similarly, authority from one Ordained judge can be passed to a proper and worthy candidate who will be the next generation of authority.

The granting of authority confers spiritual strength

When Shaul was first anointed as King, Shmuel told him what would happen to him which would be indicative of the actions of the prophecy coming to fruition. He would take various actions, experience various occurrences, and in conclusion[xlviii] וצלחה עליך רוח ה’ והתנבית עמם, ונהפכת לאיש אחר – and you [Shaul] will have the Spirit of G-d successfully [rest upon you], and you will prophesize among them; and you shall be turned into a different person.

Similarly, as noted above by the Sifri, סמיכה was not just a transference of authority. It included the endowment of the Divine Presence. Judges became the physical representatives of G-d in this world.

The initial appointment requires extreme authority from a lesser authority

The Gemara[xlix] as codified by the Rambam[l] requires the initial appointment of a king to a position of sovereignty is made by a Supreme Court – the full seventy-one (71) Justices of the Sanhedrin – AND anointed by a prophet. While the King will outrank the Sanhedrin in executive civil power, his power must be initiated by the Sanhedrin and guided by Divine Will.

Similarly, the appointment of an individual to start a new סמיכה chain requires those of lesser authority – all the existing sages in the Land of Israel – as well as an aspect of guidance by Divine Will, the agreement of the entire people on a single issue.

In Conclusion

There’s certainly plenty of legal comparisons and precedent (both those I thought of and that which the Rambam considered) to deal with the unprecedented breaking of the סמיכה chain for which the Rambam is basing his statement of נראים לי הדברים – these things appear [to be correct] to me [the Rambam]. Time will have to tell – or if the sages in the Land of Israel can come together on this issue and attempt to reinstate סמיכה or if we will חס ושלום be forced[24] to wait עד יערה עלינו רוח ממרום והיה המדבר לכרמל וכרמל ליער יחשב – until a spirit from on high will be poured upon us, and the wilderness is transformed into farmland, and the farmland will be considered like a forest.

However, the Rambam does not leave this as a rule / law that he thinks is correct. Instead, he concludes with והדבר צריך הכרע. Rabbi Beirav took this to mean that it simply requires a decision to act on it. The word הכרע being similar to מכריע – the decider. In other words, all it takes is the Jewish people to move forward and act upon it.

While ultimately, Rabbi Levi Ibn Habib prevailed, perhaps that was because Rabbi Beirav approached the matter improperly. Convening only the Rabbis of a single city. Not obtaining the consensus of the entire body of authority in the Land of Israel. Having himself appointed, whom, as it turned out, was not acceptable to all sages within the Land of Israel.

Perhaps, had Rabbi Beirav learned the word הכרע as being similar to כורע – to kneel, he would have implemented this properly. The procedure of appointing a leader to the Jewish people, must, as we find with Moshe, be only reluctantly accepted by the one granted the authority. He must kneel to the needs of the people and be kneeling to the Divine Will. Having one’s own agenda completely subverts the process and ends only with dissention.

Perhaps, if we are united enough and humble enough, we can be מכריע.

SOURCES

[1] Granted there are many Midrashic interpolations inserted into the meaning of the text, and while true, they do not detract from the fundamental point. The evil doers challenged Moshe’s authority as not having been granted to him, and Moshe had no response to that legal point.

[2] Granted there are cases in which a person may take the law into his own hands, which actions are deemed lawful. However, that is not an ultimate authority – and can be challenged by the other party in court.

[3] With the dissolution of the original court system, our judges have become the שלוחים of the prior courts and the policing authority that went with the courts. Therefore, they are able to enact both the legislative function of the courts in adjudicating cases, but they also have the ability to act as proxies for the שוטרים by confiscating assets, rendering people’s property ownerless, and excommunication – which is a form of coercion. See Shulĉan Aruĉ Ĉoshen Mishpat 2:1 etc.

[4] And of course, the word used in that verse is also used in various other verses as relates to judges. See SMG negative Mitzva 16. See also Tehillim 82:1 and the commentaries on that verse.

[5] It is interesting to note that although the rules of סמיכה require a physical presence in the land of Israel, and do not require the physical ‘laying of hands’ to symbolize the granting of authority – the very first known case of סמיכה was conducted outside the land of Israel, and with the ‘laying of hands’ – when Moshe ordained Yehoshua as the next leader of the Jewish people, as it says in the verse [Bamidbar 27:23] ויסמך את ידיו עליו ויצוהו.

Also of note, these very Elders which were also ordained, as per the statements by Moshe that he founded judges to rule during the Jewish people’s time in the wilderness, were not recorded as having received סמיכה from Moshe. Indeed, the first Mishna in Pirkei Avos notes ויהושע לזקנים – that Yehoshua is the one who transferred the Oral Torah to the Elders, and not Moshe – even though the Elders had been alive with Moshe and certainly learned directly from him. Presumably, the Mishna is written in that fashion, because the Elders only received סמיכה from Yehoshua.

Assuming this is correct, this could be the source of the idea that a judge, nor ordained, and living outside of the land of Israel (in the wilderness) can be appointed as a judge in certain matters – as the only way we can say that they [the Elders] were judges, when they did not receive ordination, is if they are acting as proxies of the only one with true authority – a judge appointed by the Omnipotent.

As for Yehoshua being the exception to the rule, in receiving סמיכה outside the land of Israel, that can be answered simply, as the verse itself continues כאשר צוה ה’ ביד משה – this was done by G-d’s command through Moshe. It was a special command issued in order to set up the institute of ordination. Since Moshe himself could not enter the land, and would have to die in the wilderness, in order for ordination to work, Moshe was granted one time authority to ordain Yehoshua outside the land of Israel.

[6] Although, the Gemara [Gem. Nedarim 49b, see also Yer. Shabbos 8:1] (for example) does describe Rabbi Yehuda’s face glowing, those sages with this phenomenon are not a common occurrence. This achievement seems to be the result of their own spirituality rather than being conferred upon them.

[7] Modern day Gaza

[8] Modern day Tyre

[9] It is said about the Vilna Gaon, that he would pay various tradesman and craftsman, including weavers, cobblers, tailors and others, to teach him their trades and craft so that he could understand the various things that the Gemara was talking about.

[10] It is important not to confuse this type of Expert with what the Shulĉan Aruĉ describes as an Expert Judge – which uses the same מומחה term, because, in Hebrew, that word means “Expert”.

[11] Presumably due to the renaissance conducted by Hillel the Elder in repopulating the Sanhedrin with qualified Elders, during the times of the בני בתירא – after the extermination campaign in the times of שמעון בן שטח.

[12] I am unsure if this usage of the word warrants the spelling as if it were the name of G-d or not. Out of an abundance of caution, I spelled it incorrectly as if I were writing a name of G-d.

[13] The Yerushalmi [Yer. Makos 1:8] quotes Rabbi Dostai son of Rabbi Yanai, who teaches that each tribe must have a judge who is the Justice of the Tribe. The Gemara [Gem. Sanhedrin 16b] states something similar; judges and police are appointed per each tribe.

[14] A mnemonic to remember this terrible change is that from שֵבֶט – the rod, the Rabbinic power to coerce, we now have שֶבֶת – the payment for being unemployed (as Rabbis are often paid for their time as an unemployed laborer). And from מחוקק – the hewer (from the word חק – a law without explanation), the legislator who can issue rulings like carvings are hewn into stone – permanent authority, we now have מחוקק – that which can be erased (from the word מחק – erase), authority which can be disputed over time.

[15] Currently, this city is occupied by Arabs who call it Shefa-Amr. The importance of identifying the place is to ensure that people realize it was within the geographical borders of the Land of Israel.

[16] Rabbi Ze’ira was a third generation Amora, while Rabbi Meir was a Tanna

[17] They were students of Rabbi Yoĉanan, the primary compiler of the Talmud Yerushalmi.

[18] Amazing how this still holds true a thousand years later. Why can’t we ever agree on something, especially something as important as this?!

[19] It is interesting that although Rabeinu Yosef Cairo eventually (after ordaining the Alshich, who in turn ordained Rabeinu Ĉaim Vital) agreed with the opposition to this appointment, he is nevertheless recognized by all Jews as the ultimate Halaĉic authority. Even though Ashkenazim generally follow Rabbi Moshe Iserlis (Rama) when he argues with the Shulĉan Aruĉ, the Shulĉan Aruĉ still remains the ultimate authority in Jewish law.

[20] Tzefas at the time was a booming textile hub as well as the center of the newly revealed teachings of Kabbalah. Interestingly, Teverya at the time was largely desolate and in ruins.

[21] Even though the Gemara [Gem. Rosh Hashana 31a-31b] tracks the ten (10) voluntary exiles of the Sanhedrin from their Seat of Power within the Chamber of Hewn inside the Base Hamikdash eventually to Teverya, and as the Rambam [Sanhedrin 14:12] states, it is from Teverya that the Sanhedrin will ultimately be restored (to proceed in reverse order back to Yerushalayim) – nevertheless, Tzefas is not Teverya.

[22] Interestingly, the Rambam’s burial place is in Teverya.

[23] Some would argue that the agreement of all Jews in the Land of Israel on anything in itself constitutes a miracle and is a sign of the Divine Will being manifested.

[24] As to my bitter tone; as the Midrash [Midrash איכה רבה 1:23] notes on that verse, Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Simon [whose father is the same one whom we quoted before who “heard that we do not ordain outside of the Land of Israel”], and Rabbi Ayvo and the Sages said, “Since we signed from Aleph (א) through Tuff (ת), we will be comforted from Aleph (א) through Tuff (ת): [The Midrash then goes on to enumerate various lamentations and there corresponding comforts].” On the lamentation [Eiĉa 1:12] לוא עליכם כל עברי דרך הביטו וראו אם יש מכאוב כמכאבי אשר עולל לי – May this never happen to you, all who pass on the road; look and see if there is a pain like my pain, that which has been done to me. Rashi comments on this verse, that our sages have said, this refers to the Torah given right to complain about one’s troubles. And the Midrash continues, the verse עד יערה עלינו רוח ממרום is the corresponding comfort to this lamentation. When the Spirit of G-d is finally, once again poured on us, with the restoration of the Sanhedrin at the Seat of Jewish Torah Law and Authority – then it will be forbidden to complain, since one can simply appeal to the Sanhedrin for justice.

[i] Shemos 2:14

[ii] Ĉoshen Mishpat 8:1

[iii] Beraishis 49:10

[iv] Gem. Sanhedrin 5a

[v] Shemos 18:23

[vi] Devarim 1:23

[vii] Shemos 4:16

[viii] Gem. Sanhedrin 13b

[ix] Melaĉim I 17:1

[x] Melaĉim I 19:10 & 14

[xi] Gem. Sanhedrin 82a

[xii] Mal’aĉi 2:12

[xiii] Devarim 16:18

[xiv] Gem. Sanhedrin 16b

[xv] Bamidbar 27:18

[xvi] Gem. Sanhedrin 49a

[xvii] Yehoshua 1:18

[xviii] Gem. Bava Basra 75a

[xix] Gem. Sanhedrin 14a

[xx] Laws of Sanhedrin 4:6

[xxi] Yer. Bikkurim 3:3

[xxii] Yeĉezkel 36:17

[xxiii] Gem. Sanhedrin 5a

[xxiv] Pirkei Avos 1:6 & 1:16 (perhaps the dual statements refer to the two types of סמיכה as I discuss above)

[xxv] Yer. Sanhedrin 1:2

[xxvi] Yeshayahu 2:3

[xxvii] Rambam Sanhedrin 4:3

[xxviii] Rambam Sanhedrin 4:8

[xxix] Rambam Sanhedrin 4:5

[xxx] See Sifri on Bamidbar 11:16-17, see also Rambam Sanhedrin 4:1

[xxxi] Gem. Bava Kamma 84a

[xxxii] Shemos 22:7

[xxxiii] See SMG positive Mitzvos 150-153

[xxxiv] Gem. Makkos 7a, Sanhedrin 16b

[xxxv] Devarim 16:18

[xxxvi] Vayikra 4:13

[xxxvii] See Gem. Sanhedrin 87a

[xxxviii] See Gem. Sanhedrin 5a

[xxxix] See Gem. Sanhedrin 33a and Shulĉan Aruĉ Ĉoshen Mishpat Chp. 25

[xl] Shulĉan Aruĉ Yoreh Day’ah 242:31

[xli] Gem. Sanhedrin 13a-14b

[xlii] Gem. Sanhedrin 14a

[xliii] Rambam Sanhedrin 4:11

[xliv] Gem. Makos 23a

[xlv] See Gem. Rosh Hashana 22a עדות זו מסורה לכם

[xlvi] Shmuel I 10:1

[xlvii] Shmuel I 10:14-15

[xlviii] Shmuel I 10:6

[xlix] Gem. Sanhedrin 71b

[l] Rambam Melaĉim 1:3

Principles of סמיכה