However, on the day prior, leavening agents shall be caused to desist from your homes
Verse: אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאר מבתיכם
Command: Destroy your Chometz the day before Pesach
Shemos 12:15
Type: Positive
SMG Mitzva # 39
Cross-Ref: {link}
SMG
Establishing the Mitzva
It is a positive Mitzva from the Torah to remove Ĉometz before the time passes when it may be eaten, as it says in the verse[i] אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שׂאור מבתיכם. [α] And our Rabbis derived in the Gemara[ii] that this ביום הראשון – first day is the fourteenth (14th) [of Nissan]. The proof for this is from the verse[iii] לא תשחט על חמץ דם זבחי – Do not slaughter on Ĉometz the blood of my sacrifice, in other words, do not slaughter the sacrifice while Ĉometz still exists. And the slaughtering of the Pesaĉ sacrifice is on the fourteenth (14th) day [of Nissan] after midday. And, according to Rabbi Akiva[iv], this term of השבתה is burning. [β] Rabeinu Shlomo [Rashi] says[v], as does Rabeinu Moshe [Rambam], that when we say that biblically, simply nullifying [the Ĉometz in one’s heart] is sufficient, meaning in one’s thoughts, which [as Tosefos[vi] notes] is a question on the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who states that [the term השבתה refers to] burning – what then can be said. Rabeinu Yitzĉok [quoted in Tosefos] states that the reason nullification works [γ] is because [of a loophole triggered when] the item becomes ownerless, and as we derive in the Gemara[vii], [the prohibition of having Ĉometz – see negative Mitzvos 77 and 78] apply only to ‘your’ Ĉometz which may not be seen, but you may ‘see’ another person’s Ĉometz or that which belongs to the one-above’.[1] [Now,] even though we have said in the Gemara[viii] that we do not render something ownerless, unless [the removal of ownership was done in the presence of] three (3) people – that criteria is only Rabbinic.[ix] And what is this ביטול – nullification, it is to nullify the Ĉometz, and to consider it as dirt, and to set in one’s heart that he has no Ĉometz at all in his possession, and that all the Ĉometz found in his domain is as dirt and like something which has no purpose at all[2].
When is the destruction of Chometz done
We learnt in the Mishna[x] אור לארבעה עשר – lit. at the light of the fourteenth (14th) meaning at night at the beginning of the fourteenth (14) [day of Nisan] we search [for Ĉometz] by candlelight in hiding places and holes, because[xi] at night, the whole nation is found in their homes, and candlelight is a good medium[3] by which to search [for Ĉometz] – since, the Torah was extremely strict about it, by providing a negative Mitzva for seeing it [negative Mitzva 77] and a negative Mitzva for finding it [see negative Mitzva 78]; [which negative Mitzvos are violated, when Ĉometz is seen or found] when a person hasn’t nullified it. Therefore, [due to the stringencies imposed by the Torah] the sages enacted that a search [for Ĉometz] is required, even when a person did indeed nullify it, out of concern that a person might come to eat the Ĉometz [that he had nullified]. Furthermore the punishment of כרת is applied when eating it, and [he might come to eat the Ĉometz that he had nullified] because a person is not generally separated from Ĉometz.[4] And the Gemara says there that we do not set learning schedules in the study hall to occur from the end of the thirteenth (13th) [of Nissan] [until after the preparations for the Seder are completed]. Similarly, Sages should not begin reading [Torah] at that time, lest he extend his learning, and not perform the search at the beginning of the time to do so. Rav Yehuda said[xii] that one who searches [for Ĉometz] must nullify [the Ĉometz found] during[5] the search. Rabeinu Yitzĉok son of Rabbi Avrohom would say that it is a Kosher custom to nullify the Ĉometz also when destroying it, because it is normal for a person to go again and buy Ĉometz the next day[6], which was not included in the nullification the night before. Also, if a person does not buy new Ĉometz, he could go back and take ownership of the bread he nullified, even though the implication of the establishment of the Halaĉa does not imply this possibility; when the Gemara asks
‘let him nullify it in the fourth (4th) hour [of the morning of the fourteenth (14th) of Nisan, and [δ] let him nullify it in the fifth (5th) hour [of the morning of the fourteenth (14th) of Nisan]
Answer: since it is neither the time of destroying [the Ĉometz], nor is it the time when [the Ĉometz is] forbidden, perhaps he will transgress by not nullifying it [the Ĉometz].
Which presumably implies that if one nullifies it [the Ĉometz], [doing so] once is sufficient.
Who searches [and is believed to have searched] for Chometz
And [as noted in the Gemara[xiii]] everyone is believed as to the status of checking for Ĉometz, even women, servants and children. And [this applies] even when we know they haven’t checked – and they say they have checked – they are believed. Because the search for Ĉometz is required Rabbinically and the Rabbis believed them. [This reasoning is the primary driver for believing women about the status of having searched for Ĉometz,] because as noted [by Tosefos[xiv]] that women are even believed biblically in various situations, for example when it comes to removing blood vessels and salting meat [to prevent the violation of the negative Mitzva against eating blood – see negative Mitzva 137] – that applies to something that women know are certainly forbidden, but when it comes to the search for Ĉometz, they would presume that there isn’t Ĉometz in the holes [in the wall] and would therefore not bother to search there because of laziness[7] [ε]. That is how it was explained in the Yerushalmi[xv].
How is Chometz searched for
[As noted previously] we do not search [for Ĉometz] by sunlight – when one hasn’t searched at night – nor by moonlight, nor by torchlight, because one will be preoccupied [meaning] one will be scared that [the torch] will set the house on fire, and will rush the search. Instead, we only use candlelight. This applies [when searching in] holes and hiding places. But in a hallway, where there is a lot of light, if one searched by sunlight, that is enough.
Where is Chometz searched for
And the center of [an open aired] courtyard does not require searching, because birds can be found there, and they will eat all Ĉometz that falls there. A hole that is found in between [the domains of] a person and his friend[8] each one searches the hole to the extent that they can reach – and anything else is to be nullified in their heart[s]. Any place where Ĉometz is not brought in does not require a search. A hole found in between a Jew and an Aramean[9] should not be searched lest the gentile suspect him [the Jew] of performing witchcraft.[10] Instead, he should nullify it in his heart in accordance with the opinion of P’limo[11]. When it comes to holes in the house found between the lower and upper floors, the ceiling underneath the roof, a barn, a chicken coop, wine cellars, and oil repositories, which are not in use, and a house to store large fish (perhaps referring to a hatchery) [ζ] – none of these require searching, unless one brings in Ĉometz there[12]. However, a Kellar (storage houses of beer[13]), wine cellars in use, salt cellars, wax locker (a storage room for wax[14]), a fishing room (to store small fish), woodsheds, storage rooms for brine tanks, crawl spaces between houses, and similar types of places require a search [for Ĉometz] because probably Ĉometz was brought in there. If one knows for certain that Ĉometz was not brought in, there is no need to search for it there. When one searches a storage cellar, one need only search the outer two (2) layers, which are the top one and the one underneath it. We are not concerned about a crumb of Ĉometz which a weasel (or other small rodent) might have crumbled in taking Ĉometz from a place where Ĉometz was brought to a place where [humans] do not bring Ĉometz. Because, if we were to be concerned that Ĉometz could be brought from one structure to another, why not be concerned about Ĉometz[15] that is brought from city to city, ad absurdum. If one searched on the night of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nissan], and he placed ten (10) pieces of bread [as is the custom] and [only] found nine[16] – one should be concerned and is therefore required to search a second time, because certainly[17] a rodent or mouse crumbled it.
What Chometz must be destroyed
We’ve proven in the Gemara[xvi] that the dough in the cracks of the mixing bowl; if there is a k’Zayis in a single place, then it (preferably the dough) must be destroyed. And if not [if there isn’t sufficient dough in the cracks of the mixing bowl to form a k’Zayis in a single place] then; if it was made there to ‘strengthen’ – Rabeinu Yitzĉok explained[xvii] strengthening means to strengthen the mixing bowl[18] – whether [these cracks] are in the place where kneading occurs[19] or where kneading does not occur, for example; on the lip-edge of the bowl, it is nullified as being an insignificantly small proportion. If not[20], one is obligated to destroy [the Ĉometz].
What happens if you wont be home then
In the Gemara[xviii] we’ve said; one who is setting sail in the ocean, or joining a caravan, within thirty (30) days [of the fourteenth (14th) of Nissan – in other words, any time between Purim and Pesaĉ] he is required to destroy [the Ĉometz in his residence prior to leaving]. If this was before the thirty (30) days [if he sets sail or joins a caravan before Purim], he is not required to destroy [the Ĉometz in his residence. And if his intention is to return[21] he must search [for Ĉometz, and destroy it] and then he may go, because, perhaps, he will return on the day before Pesaĉ in the late afternoon and he won’t have time to destroy the Ĉometz [before Pesaĉ sets in]. And if his intent is not to return, then he does not need to search [for the Ĉometz]. [!] The same applies to one who has turned his house into a place of storage within thirty (30) days [of the holiday], he must search [for Ĉometz in the house] prior to moving the storage materials inside. If he [converted the house to a place of storage] prior to the thirty (30) day window, then; if he intends to remove the contents of storage before Pesaĉ [which would make the house available to be a house again] then, he must search [for Ĉometz prior to rendering the house a place of storage], and thereafter he can convert it to a place of storage. And if he does not intend to empty the place of storage prior to Pesaĉ, he does not need to search [for Ĉometz].[22]
What happens if the search could not be performed on time
When a person searches and seeks out [Ĉometz] on the night of the fourteenth (14th), he removes [all] the Ĉometz from the holes in the walls, and from the hiding places, and places them in a protected place until the beginning of the sixth (6th) hour of the [following morning] day and burns it. If the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan] falls out on Shabbos, one searches for Ĉometz on the night prior to Shabbos, which is the night of the thirteenth (13th) [of Nisan] and places from the Ĉometz a sufficient amount to eat until the [end of the] fourth (4th) hour on the day of Shabbos, and one places that in a guarded place, and the rest [of the Ĉometz] is burned before Shabbos. And if there is leftover Ĉometz after the four (4) hours on Shabbos morning, one nullifies it in one’s heart and covers it with a vessel[23] [η] until after the first day of the holiday [or the second day in the diaspora] and then burns it. One who forgot or deliberately did not search [for Ĉometz] in the night of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan] searches [for Ĉometz] on the day of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan] in the morning. If he did not search [for Ĉometz] in the morning on the day of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan], he searches [for Ĉometz] at the time when Ĉometz is being burned. If he did not search [for Ĉometz] when it was being burned, he searches [for Ĉometz] within the holiday[24]. This is the phrasing of the Mishna[xix] לא בדק בשחרית, יבדוק בתוך המועד – if he did not search in the morning, he searches during the holiday. And Rabeinu Yitzĉok [Tosefos] and Rabeinu Moshe [Rambam] explain, that the entire time period from the beginning of the sixth hour until after the holiday is called מועד – the special time [holiday]. If the holiday passed and he did not search [for Ĉometz], he should search [for Ĉometz] after the holiday in order to burn any Ĉometz over which Pesaĉ passed – since such is forbidden to derive benefit from.
The ברכה for the Mitzva
When one searches [for Ĉometz] on the night of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan] or the day of the fourteenth (14th) [of Nisan] or during the holiday; before one starts searching, one recites the ברכה of:
ברוך אתה ה’ אלקינו מלך העולם אשר קידשנו במצותיו וצונו על ביעור חמץ.
Blessed are you G-d, our Almighty king of the world, who sanctified us with his commandments and commanded us concerning the destructing of Ĉometz.
because that [version of the text] is the conclusion that was arrived at there (in the Gemara) as the Halaĉa. [However,] if he searched after the holiday, he does not recite the ברכה.
Can Chometz which hasnt been nullified on time be nullified later
One who has not nullified the Ĉometz prior to the start of the sixth (6th) hour [on the fourteenth (14th) of Nisan] can no longer nullify the Ĉometz, because it is no longer his possession – as, Rabbinically, it has already been forbidden to him to derive benefit from and therefore, his nullification does not help at all. As for being guilty of violating the prohibitions of לא יראה and לא ימצא, the Torah has made it as if it Biblically belongs to him, [θ] even after the sixth (6th) hour [on the fourteenth (14th) of Nisan]. Rav Yehuda said, one who finds Ĉometz on the holiday [of Pesaĉ][25]; he covers it over with a vessel. Meaning, we are talking about where [the found Ĉometz] had been nullified [timely], because if it hadn’t been nullified, he would be able to burn it on the holiday – because, according to Rav Yehuda, as stated elsewhere in the Gemara[xx], since burning has been rendered permitted on the holiday for the purpose of preparing food, therefore, burning in general is permitted even if it is not for the purpose of preparing food, so long as it has a purpose for the holiday.[26]
How is the destruction of Chometz by burning derived
We’ve established the Halaĉa in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who stated in the Gemara[xxi], the only way to destroy Ĉometz is by burning it. [ι] [The reason we have established the Halaĉa in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda is] because the Mishna[xxii] taught in accordance with his opinion, without mentioning a potential difference of opinion – as we learnt [there] ‘These are that which must be burnt; Teruma that has been rendered Tamay, Ĉometz on Pesaĉ, [etc.]’ And even though Rabbi Yehuda was silent[27] [κ], we will not be silent, because the only counter offered by the sages was based on Rabbi Yehuda’s own words[28], where he argues with the Sages elsewhere[xxiii]. Rabbi Yehuda derives that Ĉometz must be burnt from the comparison to נותר – leftover sacrificial meat; just like leftover sacrificial meat must be burnt after the point where it becomes forbidden, so too Ĉometz is treated in the same manner. However, prior to the point where it becomes forbidden, its removal can be accomplished using any method. And this is how it was explained in the Yerushalmi[xxiv] and in our Gemara[xxv], where Rabbi Yehuda said
‘when is the time during which it must be burnt, when it is not the time to remove it.
meaning, for example, after six (6) [hours into the day – midday[29]].
However, during time when it is being destroyed,
meaning the sixth hour [in the hour before midday (,or prior)], when everyone[30] engages in the destruction of Ĉometz,
then it may be removed using any method.
That is how Rabeinu Yitzĉok explained this.
Alternative methods of destroying Chometz (not recommended)
If there was Ĉometz on which a structure collapsed, and there is dirt-rubble that buried it with a thickness of at least three (3) handsbreadths or more, that is the same as if it was destroyed. But one must still nullify [the buried Ĉometz] in his heart.
[1] As noted in the discussion on negative Mitzva 77, the verse states לא יראה לך – do not see for yourself. The possessive term in the verse expresses that one isn’t required to destroy all Ĉometz that one sees. Instead, only that which belongs to the person לך must be destroyed by its owner – if they are Jewish or human.
[2] If one’s considers Ĉometz like dirt alone, one might use it as compost – which is insufficiently nullified. SMG adds a component that one must determine that the Ĉometz is completely without purpose, not even as dirt. Meaning, that the intent of rendering Ĉometz like dirt is similar to the way dirt is treated in terms of a need to maintain something clean. It might otherwise have purpose, but as far as this person is concerned, its presence is a problem and it needs to be physically removed [and according to Rabbi Akiva, burned] when noticed.
[3] I find it interesting that the SMG does not explain the reason that candlelight is ‘good’ for searching. Instead, he explains the reason why we search for Ĉometz at all – which we do not do with any other forbidden item – because the Torah was extra stringent about it in forbidding it in two ways, ‘seeing it’ and ‘finding it’.
The Gemara offers two reasons as to why candlelight should be used:
- Candlelight is both dim and small. Therefore, one will be required to examine everywhere one searches closely in order to be able to see properly, and because the fire is small, one will not be afraid to do so.
- Based on the verse [Tzephanya 1:12] והיה בעת ההיא אחפש את ירושלם בנרות – and it will be at that time, I [G-d] will search Yerushalayim by ‘candlelight’, and as the Gemara [Gem. Pesaĉim 7b] notes candles are a description of the soul, as it says in the verse [Mishlei 20:27] נר ה’ נשמת אדם, חפש כל חדרי בטן – the soul of mankind is G-d’s candle; seeking all ‘rooms of the belly’.
The Yerushalmi [Pesaĉim 1:1] quotes Rabbi Yirmiyah in the name of Rabbi Shmuel son of Rav Yitzĉok who asks the question:
Can one search by torchlight, as its light is ‘flashing’. The Yerushalmi discounts that possibility and states that candlelight is required, because it can search any amount.
Similarly, the Gemara [Pesaĉim 7b-8a] quotes a Beraissa which states:
We do not search for Ĉometz by sunlight, moonlight, or torchlight. We only use candlelight, because candlelight is good for searching. There is no proof for this, but there is a remanence of this idea when noting that the verse [Shemos 12:19] states שבעת ימים שאר לא ימצא בבתיכם – [for] seven (7) days, leavening agents shall not be found in one’s homes. And [when it comes to searching] the verse [Beraishis 44:12] says ויחפש בגדול החל [ובקטן כלה] – and they searched; starting at the ‘large’ [oldest] and finishing with the smallest [youngest]. And, as it says in the verse והיה בעת ההיא אחפש את ירושלם בנרות – and as it says in the verseנר ה’ נשמת אדם, חפש כל חדרי בטן.
Neither Gemara, nor Yerushalmi, nor Beraissa explain why the verse from Tzephanya, which talks about G-d searching for those who do not believe in G-d, is appropriate to derive a lesson as to how we are to search for Ĉometz.
Rashi though provides us with the answer. He notes that a different way of viewing a search by candlelight is that candlelight is small. This verse is noting that while G-d will examine people to seek out those who do not believe, he does so with candlelight and not a searchlight. In other words, G-d is not being too exacting in determining who falls into that category.
Along those lines, I believe we can add another point; when a person searches by candlelight, the candle is held in front of the person’s face, making it extremely difficult to see that which you are looking for. Similarly, G-d is, so to speak, blinding himself with the light of the Jewish soul from being able to see the faults he is searching for in those Jews who profess to not believe in him.
Perhaps this is what the Yerushalmi means when it states that candlelight can search ‘any amount’, it is up to the one searching how detailed he wants to get, to focus on the large issues, or on the small. These days G-d chooses to only search for massive problems, easily visible even by candlelight, and even then, he ‘blinds himself’ to those problems with the light of the soul.
[4] It would seem to be from this statement that the sages enacted the requirement to search due to a potential violation of negative Mitzva 76 – the prohibition against eating Ĉometz.
However, if that were the case, why does the SMG include the obligation here in positive Mitzva 39, especially if the book on negative Mitzvos was written prior to the book on positive Mitzvos – which seems to be the case. He should have included it with negative Mitzva 76.
It seems to me that the SMG might possibly be considering a novel idea: if one eats Ĉometz that one has previously nullified in one’s heart – is one eating Ĉometz or ‘dust of the earth’. Obviously, one is eating Ĉometz, as people do not eat dust. Therefore, in the moment that a person eats the Ĉometz, wouldn’t he be nullifying [undoing] the previous nullification of the Ĉometz?
Now, I haven’t seen anywhere that the Halaĉa discusses the idea of a ‘reverse nullification’ except in the concept of חוזר וניער – where a substance is nullified do to being di minimus, and then, when additional material of the same substance is added, to a point sufficiently numerous to be no longer di minimus, the original material which had been nullified ‘wakes up’ and joins the new material, making it all forbidden.
However, that type of nullification is a nullification of the material, not a nullification of the consideration of what the material is. The point of the nullification of Ĉometz is not to render it non-Ĉometz, but rather to render it ownerless, like the dust of the earth. Since the Torah prohibits לא יראה לך, and לא ימצא בבתיכם – that it is prohibited to see your Ĉometz, or find Ĉometz in your home, that means that Ĉometz which does not belong to you is not prohibited. By rendering the Ĉometz ownerless, one removes the possibility of violating the Torah prohibition of these two negative Mitzvos.
However, when a person picks up the otherwise ownerless cookie, and eats it, that act renders the Ĉometz his – even if it wasn’t ownerless, but was stolen from another person. Because the act of eating it extends the person’s ownership over the cookie. Therefore, even if previously the cookie was ownerless, by eating it, the person is taking ownership of something that belongs to no one and not violates the two negative Mitzvos against seeing or finding Ĉometz, in addition to the violation of the negative Mitzva against eating Ĉometz. Since the search for [and subsequent removal of] Ĉometz protects one against all three negative Mitzvos, it is appropriate for the SMG to include the details of the Rabbinic decree in the positive Mitzva, instead of limiting the discussion to one of the negative Mitzvos.
I believe this makes sense and is incontrovertible, especially considering the SMG’s quote of Rabeinu Yitzĉok son of Rabbi Avrohom – where the SMG notes momentarily the idea that a person can go back and acquire that which he previously nullified.
[5] In addition to the nullification done during the destruction of the Ĉometz on the following morning.
[6] Prior to refrigeration, it was normal to buy or make food daily, rather than relying on storage.
[7] I doubt that the cleaning of the house before Pesaĉ and neglecting to clean out every hole is considered laziness. Regardless, the understanding here is that we cannot simply believe women, slaves and children (and men) about something that there is an assumption that they haven’t done, and that there is a reasonable assumption that they haven’t done it. And this isn’t comparable to cases where women’s statements are taken at face value – because, unlike, for example, cleaning out blood from the meat, the women rightfully assume that if the Ĉometz – which probably isn’t there – is never found, then there is no violation of finding Ĉometz on Pesaĉ.
I myself once replaced a wall unit air conditioner, and in breaking down the wall to make room for the air conditioning unit, I found an old box of cereal that had been stuffed into the concrete – presumably for insulation. And yet, we aren’t required to break down our walls and search for Ĉometz in the walls used for insulation. That was obviously an outlier experience, and not something that we need to be careful of.
Instead, as part of the rules of בדיקת חמץ, the sages established that anyone is to be believed as to the status of the search for Ĉometz, even if we know for certain they haven’t actually conducted the search.
[8] Meaning, when a person has an adjoining wall that both people use as the outer wall of their home. And this wall has a hole extending from one side to the other – accessible by both.
[9] Or any non-Jew.
[10] Blood libels in association with Pesaĉ took many forms throughout the centuries. Any excuse the non-Jews could come up with has been tried.
[11] It is unclear if this was an actual person named P’limo, or if this is the John Doe of the Gemara’s time, now called פלוני.
[12] My grandfather, who grew up on a farm in upstate New York, used to say that a month before Pesaĉ, the animal feed was switched from grains to hay. He said this was because his father did not want the milk to be Ĉometz. My grandfather was presumably not a Torah scholar and could have been confused. Perhaps my great-grandfather was concerned about the water from the trough mixing with the grain feed to form Ĉometz.
Regardless, they would have had to search for Ĉometz in that barn if they thought the grain had turned to Ĉometz.
[13] Presumably where the beer has been sold. Obviously, the beer itself is Ĉometz.
[14] Or museums.
[15] As noted in negative Mitzva 78, the prohibition of Ĉometz extends to Ĉometz owned by the person regardless of where it is located, and regardless of whether a person can see it or not. Therefore, if we wanted to go to remote possibilities, we could be concerned about a bird who grabbed a piece of Ĉometz owned by you and flew off to a distant city. Therefore, all cities within bird-flying radius would have to be searched.
[16] Unclear if the SMG means that he found the ten (10) pieces from their hiding places, put them all in one bag, and then later, prior to burning it, he only finds nine (9) – or if the initial search for the ten (10) pieces did not result in finding all ten (10). Either way, the Halaĉa is the same for either scenario.
[17] The wording implies that the pieces were initially found, and then later there was a missing piece from the bag. But the same rule applies if one couldn’t find the tenth (10th) piece in the first place.
The concern about the rodent is not about the piece that rodent took – as that is assumed to be eaten by the rodent. Instead, we are worried about the crumbs made when the rodent eats the piece, as they are somewhat messy eaters.
[18] In other words, if the dough was placed in the cracks as mortar, to seal the cracks and strengthen the bowl.
As to why we are not concerned when the amount is smaller than a k’Zayis, and used for mortar, that the Ĉometz might come to contaminate the new ingredients; regardless of the presence of Ĉometz in the bowl, if not processed fast enough, the ingredients will become Ĉometz. The presence of the Ĉometz already in the bowl as mortar, when it is less than a k’Zayis, does not accelerate the process. And therefore, there is no concern about dough used for mortar, when it is less than a k’Zayis.
[19] Meaning, the assumption should be that if the dough is placed in cracks where the kneading occurs, then, over time the dough in the crack will rise. Since that dough then comes into contact with the new ingredients used in the bowl over Pesaĉ, the Ĉometz in the mortar-dough could trigger the new ingredients to begin rising, rendering whatever is used in the bowl as Ĉometz.
This concern is not valid, as the dough in the cracks is no longer Ĉometz, it is mortar. In the person’s mind, the quality that the dough had become Ĉometz has been nullified, he only needs the physical material there to seal up the cracks. Had real mortar been used, he would be just as happy.
[20] If the dough was not there to strengthen the bowl, then it must be destroyed, regardless of how much dough there was, and regardless of where it got stuck on the bowl. Since the dough remains dough, and is not being considered as mortar, it has not been nullified and therefore it is subject to the rules of destroying all Ĉometz.
Seemingly, the reason why the size of the dough makes a difference when it is being used for mortar is because, even though the person’s mind has nullified the dough, and therefore, it is not Ĉometz in and of itself – there is still the problem that it physically hasn’t changed. And should a person come to eat it, since it is the size of a k’Zayis, that would violate negative Mitzva 76 – Do not eat Ĉometz – even though, in his mind, he is eating mortar.
The Gemara has a similar discussion about a גלוסקא יפה – [in the words of my teacher, Rabbi Kaplan] nu, a Cookie. Even though it has been nullified in one’s heart prior to Pesaĉ and is therefore ‘like the dust of the earth’, when found on Pesaĉ one is still obligated to destroy the cookie, lest he accidentally eat it.
[21] On or before Pesaĉ
[22] It should be noted, the reason he does not need to search for Ĉometz, when the criteria exempting him from searching applies, is because we are relying on his nullification of all Ĉometz in his possession, regardless of where it is. Since the house is now a place of storage, he will not be in the house during the holiday where he might come to eat a piece of Ĉometz. Therefore, without the concern of violating negative Mitzva 76, and considering his nullification of the Ĉometz, no search efforts need be undertaken prior to the thirty (30) day window before Pesaĉ.
[23] Presumably, the SMG does not state one should destroy the Ĉometz using other means for two reasons:
- There is a preference for burning the Ĉometz, in order to follow the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that the destruction of Ĉometz must be accomplished by burning.
- Normally, the Torah does not prohibit a destructive act for the sake of destruction on Shabbos. The sages added that dimension to the prohibitions of Shabbos, but here we are talking about potentially violating a negative Mitzva from the Torah by allowing the Ĉometz to continue to exist, so why not allow the person to destroy the Ĉometz using other means, other than fire, which is prohibited by the Torah. Perhaps, the answer is because in this instance, the destruction of the Ĉometz is a constructive act, in that by doing so, one is fulfilling a Mitzva. Therefore, it would be prohibited on Shabbos.
[24] From the point when a sacrifice is offered and onward, that day is a holiday for the person offering the sacrifice. Which means, that the fourteenth of Nisan (at least in the afternoon) is also a holiday, in a similar way that חול המועד is – as the SMG will note momentarily.
[25] Assuming he had timely performed a proper search for Ĉometz, destroyed that which he found, and nullified the rest.
[26] However, since the Ĉometz was nullified, therefore, there is no Biblical Mitzva to destroy the Ĉometz he found, and therefore, there is no Biblical purpose in burning it on the holiday. Which is why Rav Yehuda rules it should be covered, to prevent accidental eating, and then after the holiday it can be burnt.
[27] The SMG is presumably referring to the following argument in the Gemara [Pesaĉim 27b-28a]:
Rabbi Yehuda taught, the destruction of Ĉometz is only done by burning. And this is based on legal logic [the application of one of the rules of derivation, namely that of the fortiori – see Rabbi Yishmael’s rules, Rule #1]: just like leftover from the sacrifices, which are not subject to the prohibitions of לא יראה and לא ימצא [negative Mitzvos 77 and 78], must be burnt [see positive Mitzva 207] – Ĉometz to which the prohibitions of לא יראה and לא ימצא apply must certainly be burnt.
Sages respond: the rules of the fortiori do not allow one to initially determine the subject of the fortiori [Ĉometz on Pesaĉ] should be treated strictly, and then in the application of the fortiori logic, it ends up being treated more leniently than that which was compared to it [the leftover from the sacrifices]. In this case, if one did not have wood to burn it [the Ĉometz on Pesaĉ], will he sit there unable to take action: The Torah stated [Shemos 12:15] תשביתו שאור מבתיכם – which implies that it must be removed using any means to get rid of it.
Thus, by forcing the person to only burn the Ĉometz, when found on the holiday, we would end up treating Ĉometz more leniently than the laws established by verse to get rid of it. So, when we consider the verses of לא יראה and לא ימצא, Ĉometz is considered stricter than leftover sacrificial meat, but in considering the verse תשביתו שאור מבתיכם, we would considered Ĉometz to be more lenient than the requirement to destroy the leftover sacrificial meat in that when it comes to the leftover sacrificial meat, we obey the verse, and when it comes to Ĉometz, we do not obey that verse.
That a person is unable to burn the Ĉometz on Pesaĉ is the result of the prohibition of Working 37, which is only permitted on a holiday when burning for the purposes of eating. Since Ĉometz cannot be eaten, therefore one may not burn it on the holiday.
Rabbi Yehuda retracted [the fortiori] and offered instead a comparison* of the two prohibited items: both Ĉometz and leftover sacrificial meat may not be eaten; just like leftover sacrificial meat must be burnt, so too Ĉometz must be burnt.
* The commentaries describe this logical inference as a גזירת שוה. However, as no specific terms in the verses are identified by which such a rule would be applied, therefore, this cannot be the rule proposed by Rabbi Yehuda. Presumably, since Rabbi Yehuda ended up retracting this logic, this distinction was not deemed relevant.
Instead, presumably, Rabbi Yehuda is stating that leftover sacrificial meat can serve as a בנין אב [Rabbi Yishmael’s Rule #3] applying the requirement to burn leftover sacrificial meat, which is derived by explicit verse, as a precedent for the required treatment of all prohibited foods [including Ĉometz].
The Sages countered: the treatment of a dead carcass [which is not Kosher] is the exception which counters that logic; it is forbidden to be eaten [negative Mitzva 133] and yet is not burnt.
Possibly this Mitzva is chosen as the ultimate counterpoint because, regarding the treatment of an animal carcass, the verse [Devarim 14:21] prohibiting this food explicitly states it is not to be burnt, as it says לגר אשר בשעריך תתננה ואכלה או מכר לנכרי. However, that logic is faulty. Since the verse explicitly provided us with instructions on how to treat the meat, that could imply that absent the explicit instructions of the verse, we would indeed be required to burn it. Which means the very counterpoint argument provided by the Gemara serves instead to imply that Rabbi Yehuda is in fact correct in establishing נותר as the baseline precedent for how to treat forbidden foods. However, this is not what Rabbi Yehuda counter argued…
Rabbi Yehuda argued; there is a difference between the two, since both leftover sacrificial meat and Ĉometz are prohibited from deriving benefit from [unlike a carcass – which, as I pointed out above, is permitted to derive benefit from]; just like leftover sacrificial meat must be burnt, so too Ĉometz must be burnt.
Rabbi Yehuda countered by expanding the details of the בנין אב as applying to all foods which are forbidden from consumption and from deriving benefit.
The Sages countered: the ox which must be stoned* [negative Mitzva 135] is the exception which counters that logic; it is both forbidden to be eaten, and forbidden from benefit – and yet, it is stoned [and then buried] and not burnt.
Again, possibly Rabbi Yehuda could have countered that there is no indication that we do not burn the stoned ox. Perhaps, instead of burying it, we should indeed burn the body. However, this is not what Rabbi Yehuda counter argued…
Rabbi Yehuda responded; there is a difference between the two, not only is נותר forbidden from eating and benefit, but a violation of that negative Mitzva is punishable by כרת. Similar to Ĉometz, which has the same punishment; just like leftover sacrificial meat must be burnt, so too Ĉometz must be burnt.
Rabbi Yehuda countered by expanding the details of the בנין אב as applying to all foods which are forbidden from consumption and from deriving benefit, and for which the punishment for violating the negative Mitzva is כרת.
The Sages said to him: The fats of the ox which must be stoned is the exception, which is forbidden to be eaten, prohibited from benefit, and the punishment for eating it is כרת [negative Mitzva 138] [and yet it need not be burnt].
Again, possibly Rabbi Yehuda could have countered that there is no indication that we do not burn the stoned ox and its fat. Perhaps, instead of burying it, we should indeed burn the whole body. However, this is not what Rabbi Yehuda counter argued…
Rabbi Yehuda retracted [the בנין אב based on the verse requiring that the leftover sacrificial meat be burnt] and offered instead a comparison* of the two prohibited items: נותר is subject to the prohibition of ‘leaving over’ [as it states in the verse [Vayikra 7:15] לא יניח ממנו עד בקר. See negative Mitzva 335], as Ĉometz is also subject to the prohibition of ‘leaving over’ [as it states in the verse [Shemos 12:10] לא תותירו ממנו עד בקר. See negative Mitzva 358]; just like leftover sacrificial meat must be burnt, so too Ĉometz must be burnt.
* Here the commentaries could have stated that this was a גזירת שוה, since the verses involved use similar terms. And yet, they do not do so. Presumably because a גזירת שוה requires a specific oral tradition for its use, and the fact that Rabbi Yehuda offered it as a teaching subject to logic implies that it is not a גזירת שוה.
The Sages said to him: the laws regarding a אשם תלוי [positive Mitzva 214, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it must be buried and cannot be burnt on the altar] and the sin offering for one who has given birth, which must be a bird, which was brought based on a doubt [positive Mitzva 220 – since it is being offered because of a doubt, it cannot be burnt on the altar according to Rabbi Yehuda, nor can it be eaten, because it was killed in a manner inconsistent with the laws of kosher slaughtering] is the exception, as these fall under the prohibition of ‘leaving over’ [all sacrifices may not be left over], and we [the Sages] state these must be burnt, while you [Rabbi Yehuda] state they must be buried.
Rabbi Yehuda was silent.
Tosefos notes that he could have responded that the reason the sacrifices were not burnt is because he derived from the verse which states קדש הוא, that only certain sacrificial items are sanctified and burnt on the altar, but these sacrifices are not to be burnt on the altar.
Since the exception is derived from specific exclusions provided for by verse, therefore, the exceptions actually prove the בנין אב rule established by Rabbi Yehuda.
However, Rabbi Yehuda decided not to continue arguing. It is on this decision that the SMG comments and says, even though he [Rabbi Yehuda] was silent, he [the SMG] will not be silent.
It thus seems to me that the SMG is stating that the בנין אב rule established by Rabbi Yehuda was correctly established. And thus the rule stands: any food item, which may not be left over – which has an obligation to consume prior to a certain time and may not be left unconsumed past that time – and yet, cannot be eaten, must be burnt.
[28] And, even without necessarily being capable of fully understanding Rabbi Yehuda’s logic, we can know for certain that his own opinion remains consistent without contradicting himself. Otherwise, if there was a reason to counter his logic, he would have retracted his statement, as we see he did when the Sages countered using other examples.
And under the rules of establishing Halaĉa, if a sages’ opinion cannot be countered in the Gemara, that is sufficient basis to establish the Halaĉa in accordance with that opinion, even though that opinion is solitary against the opinion of the majority.
[29] After which, in the afternoon, it is prohibited to remove Ĉometz in any manner other than burning it.
[30] At the end of the fifth (5th) hour of the day [as measured by dividing the day into twelve equal time periods, each called an hour], Ĉometz may no longer be eaten, and instead is destroyed by burning it, which is accomplished between the start of the sixth (6th) hour and its end [midday].
I specifically use the term ‘midday’ instead of noon, because the term ‘noon’ implies 12:00 PM, while midday is the halfway point between sunrise and sunset, regardless of what time a clock shows.
[i] Shemos 12:15
[ii] Gem. Pesaĉim 4b
[iii] Shemos 34:25
[iv] Gem. Pesaĉim 5a
[v] See Rashi בביטול ad loc.
[vi] See Tosefos מדאורייתא ad loc.
[vii] Gem. Pesaĉim 5b
[viii] Gem. Nedarim 5b
[ix] See Tosefos.
[x] Mishna Pesaĉim 1:1, see Gem. Pesaĉim 2a
[xi] See Gem. Pesaĉim 4a
[xii] Gem. Pesaĉim 6b
[xiii] Gem. Pesaĉim 4a
[xiv] Gem. Pesaĉim 4b Tosefos הימנוהו
[xv] Yer. Pesaĉim 1:1
[xvi] Gem. Pesaĉim 45a
[xvii] Tosefos כאן ad loc
[xviii] Gem. Pesaĉim 6a
[xix] Gem. Pesaĉim 10b
[xx] Gem. Kesuvos 7a
[xxi] Gem. Pesaĉim 21a – 27b
[xxii] Gem. Temura 33b
[xxiii] Gem. Temura 34a
[xxiv] Yer. Pesaĉim 2:1
[xxv] Gem. Pesaĉim 12b
AMUDAY SHLOMO
[α] And, the verse[i] states שבעת ימים שאר לא ימצא בבתיכם, which implies even one moment within the seven (7) days [of the holiday]. Accordingly, it is not possible to remove [the Ĉometz] on the first day [because at that point the violation had already occurred] and therefore, the verse [requiring its removal] must be talking about the day before the first day. Nevertheless, the time for destroying the Ĉometz in a manner which is not eating[1] starts after the six[th] (6th) hour as it says in the verse[ii] אך [ביום הראשון], and the word אך can be transposed with the word חץ in the system[iii] of אח”ס בט”ע גי”ף דכ”ן הל”ק ומ”ר זן שת:[2] in other words, part of it [the day] is forbidden and part of it [the day][3] is permitted.
Alternatively, all the terms of אך and רק are exclusionary [and thus there is an exception for the “first day” [day prior] to the prohibition of Ĉometz. Both of these explanations were explained by Rashi, and the book [SMG] previously[4] quoted הל”ק.[5]
[β] but not by means of eating it. This is easy to understand.[6]
[γ] meaning, the rule of nullifying [Ĉometz] is not derived from the term תשביתו. Which means it is not a question at all on Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, because it is derived by logic.
And the following is not a question: if so, why does the Torah require destruction of the Ĉometz when one can simply nullify it.
Answer: when Ĉometz is visibly there, the Mitzva of destroying the Ĉometz is not fulfilled by nullifying it. Even though immediately after nullifying it he is no longer culpable for violating the negative Mitzvos of לא יראה and לא ימצא, he still has not fulfilled the positive Mitzva of תשביתו.
This seems to be the proper Halaĉic ruling.
[δ] Tosefos explained that this is an either-or question, so long as the time frame is before the required time to destroy the Ĉometz.
[ε] It is for this[7] reason that they would not be believed, if the obligation to search for Ĉometz was a Biblical obligation.
[ζ] Meaning, the kind of large fish that are not normally served in a meal. This is easy to understand.
[η] Nevertheless, our custom [the Maharshal’s custom] is to give [the found Ĉometz on Pesaĉ] to gentiles [immediately and not wait until after the holiday to burn it].
[θ] Rashi explains, on Pesaĉ itself. And we should state that one is only guilty of violating the Mitzvos of לא יראה and לא ימצא if one purchased Ĉometz on Pesaĉ.
[ι] However, according to Rabbi Akiva, quoted previously, it’s not explicitly definitive that one is required to burn the Ĉometz found on Pesaĉ. Instead, he is explaining that the word תשביתו means burning. Perhaps he is of the opinion, similar to the sages, that one may also crumble it and toss it to the wind, and certainly may burn it – because the term תשביתו was not defined, and the only reason he said it means to ‘burn’ is to exclude eating it. This is difficult to understand.[8] [κ] [Maharshal quotes the Gemara and notes that the SMG follows the opinion of RY in Tosefos, and not Rashi’s commentary on the same section in the Gemara].
[1] Eating Ĉometz is considering destroying it. This might be the only Mitzva group where it is possible to fulfill a Mitzva [to destroy Ĉometz] by violating a Mitzva associated with that same act – eating Ĉometz.
[2] There are two typos in the edition I am working off of. The third transposition is supposed to be גיף and the final grouping is two (2) letters each resulting in the phrase ומר זן שת. I have not repeated those typos in the typeset above.
Maharshal is referring to the system listed in the Gemara, which groups the letters into groups of seven (7) rendering each letter associated with the eighth one thereafter, so that א, the first (1st) letter is also associated with ח, the eighth (8th) letter, which is associated with ס the fifteenth (15th) letter and so on.
In this way, the א from the word אך can be replaced with a letter ח, and the letter כ can be replaced with the eighth letter after it – the צ, rendering the word אך to be transposed with חֻץ – outside or exception.
The Gemara is quoting a Midrash which provides a fascinating conversation between G-d and the angel of Gehinom (hell). G-d was establishing that the righteous are not destined for that, and the angel of Gehinom was begging for customers, and in the end was willing to settle for being sustained זן from the descendants of שת [humanity – excluding the Jewish people].
It should be noted, that G-d’s response groups the letters in groupings of seven, which leaves the final letter ת out of the equation. Accordingly, the angel of Gehinom latched on to that and used the final two series in the groupings for his request for more souls to sustain him.
And, G-d responds to the angel of Gehinom, he does so with the groupings of eleven – which divides the entire letters into two groups. Perhaps countering the eleven “Disgusting Crowns” of evil.
The conversation is too detailed to be transcribed here in full – and far beyond the scope of what this work seeks to encompass. I encourage all readers to seek out the original quote in the Gemara.
[3] Possibly, Maharshal is noting that the grouping which transposes אך for חץ results in the letters being grouped in sevens. Therefore, the first letter [hour], followed by six (6) more is part of the permitted group, and then the day get’s transposed to a forbidden period. This results in the meaning of אך to exclude the first six hours as being permitted, with the rest of the hours being “outside” the exclusion.
It should be noted that seemingly this teaching is from the world of רמז from which we do not traditionally derive Halaĉa from. Accordingly, Maharshal offers another method of deriving this.
[4] Unclear where this occurred.
[5] The version of the Amuday Shlomo here has the words ואך חלק הביא הספר לעיל. I am unable to determine what that means in the context of what Maharshal was explaining. Therefore, I am assuming the word חלק [which means portion or divide] is actually the הל”ק set of letters from the Midrash referenced above.
Alternatively, Maharshal might be referencing a time where the word אך was used by the SMG to divide something in half, as it seems to be used here.
[6] Meaning, the burning required by Rabbi Akiva cannot be used as part of an eating process, as food is often prepared by using fire on it.
[7] Not because women cannot testify as to the status of something forbidden, but because, as noted by the SMG, this is a case where they state the room has been checked, when we know it hasn’t been and we suspect the reason it hasn’t been is because of laziness.
[8] I would offer that the term תשביתו was stated regarding the time period before Pesaĉ. And prior to Pesaĉ, Rabbi Akiva might require the burning of Ĉometz, while on Pesaĉ we do not know what his opinion is.
In other words, here, the SMG is talking about Ĉometz discovered on Pesaĉ. The requirement to burn it does not necessarily go counter to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, which opinion is only about Ĉometz discovered before Pesaĉ.
[i] Shemos 12:19
[ii] Shemos 12:15
[iii] Gem. Shabbos 104a
RASHI
Rashi provides the following commentary on the verse:
- אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאור – from the evening before the holiday. This is called ראשון – the first, because it is before the seven-day [the holiday]. And we find that which precedes is called ראשון, in the verse[i] הראישון אדם תולד – were you born before Adam. Or perhaps, it means the first of the seven [the first day of the seven-day holiday]: That is why the verse[ii] states לא תשחט על חמץ וגו’ – Do not slaughter the Pesaĉ while Ĉometz still exists.
Since the verse prohibits the continued (תשביתו) existence of Ĉometz from the point where the Pesaĉ offering was slaughtered, that means that the verse requiring the destruction of Ĉometz must be talking about a time period before that time. Therefore, ביום הראשון in this verse actually means the day prior[1], without specifying what that day is prior to.
Perhaps, we can say that this opening – which the Torah provides by not specifying which day the ביום הראשון is prior to – is what gives rise to the Sages determination to require the search for, and destruction of, Ĉometz at any point in the thirty (30) days prior. Even though the verses intent is the day prior to Pesaĉ, it also left room for a different day which could be established by the Sages ruling in the centuries that followed.
[1] And semantically, that is the definition of ‘first’ – something that is prior to that which comes next.
[i] Iyov 15:7
[ii] Shemos 34:25
Discussion by SMS
On the definition of תשביתו
Unclear as to why the sages didn’t note that the term used in the verse תשביתו implies a ceasing that already exists – as in a process prevented prior to the start of the holiday. Leavening takes time, and in order to ensure that on the first day of Pesaĉ, there will be no Ĉometz, one is obligated to prevent that which could become leavened while it is still unrisen on the fourteenth (14th) of Nissan. Learning the verse in this fashion would render the ביום הראשון as the first day of the holiday – in line with a simple reading of the verse.
Possibly, Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is that Ĉometz must be burnt because the Torah doesn’t state תשביתו חמץ מבתיכם, rather the Torah uses the term שאור which is the leavening agent that causes Ĉometz to be formed from flour and water.
The difference of this word choice is that the word חמץ describes what is, while the word שאור describes a material or process which will cause-something-to-be. The significance of this distinction is: ביטול works to nullify what is. However, when there is שאור involved, the ‘Ĉometz-that-is’ could continue to rise into the ‘Ĉometz-that-will-be’, and this new bit of Ĉometz has not been nullified. To prevent that possibility, the Ĉometz must be burnt, which is the only way to תשבית – interrupt, the שאור – leavening agent from continuing to work and produce more Ĉometz.
Discussion on leaving before Pesach
[!] The obligation to search for Ĉometz is a Rabbinical obligation, as the SMG noted with regard to who is believed when they state that they searched for Ĉometz. The obligation to destroy all Ĉometz in one’s possession is Biblical.
In the case of leaving on a long voyage, or traveling on a trip by caravan, the assumption is that the person will not be back home for Pesaĉ. That doesn’t exempt him from destroying Ĉometz in his possession – as explained in negative Mitzva 77 and 78, the prohibitions of לא יראה לך and לא ימצא preclude having any Ĉometz in one’s possession on Pesaĉ, even if the person is not physically present to see the Ĉometz.
In the case of a person setting out on a voyage or caravan prior to the thirty (30) day mark, the Ĉometz is still in the person’s possession, why then is he not obligated to destroy it.
The answer is that of course the person is obligated to destroy the Ĉometz, regardless of where he is. Since we do not follow the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that destruction can take the form of Nullification, even if the person is not present where the Ĉometz is. [Or, as per the modern custom, he can sell the Ĉometz prior to Pesaĉ.]
This removes consideration of a Biblical violation of possessing Ĉometz. As for the Rabbinic obligation of searching for Ĉometz, it would seem from the application of the thirty (30) day window to be part of the general obligations in preparing for a holiday – which begin thirty days before the start of the holiday. This “preparation obligation” is derived[i] from Moshe’s decision to teach the laws of פסח שני on the fourteenth (14th) of Nissan, which is exactly thirty (30) days from the date of פסח שני.
If the consideration of the thirty (30) day window is what drives the obligation to search for Ĉometz prior to setting out on a journey, then that would mean that this window remains in effect even in modern times, when it is possible to return from any point on the globe in time for Pesaĉ, no matter how far away one has traveled. In other words, it is not the possibility of being home in time for Pesaĉ that drives the obligation to search, it is the requirement of preparing for Pesaĉ that drives the obligation to search. And, since this obligation only kicks in after Purim, then that means one who is not home at that point, does not have that obligation – even if he could return in time for the obligation to kick in.
[i] See Gem. Pesaĉim 6a-b
Key
Etymology and Definitions of Defined Terms
- שאור – leavening agent. In other words, that-which-light [heat] [activates]. The leavening agent in yeast is a single-celled fungus. It is a microorganism that requires light and heat [within a specific range] to activate and thrive. Similarly, there are chemical leaveners, like baking soda [sodium bicarbonate (NaHCO3)], which use heat to produce the same effect as the yeast.
- להשבית – cessation. See Discussion for a reason as to why this term might be used instead of a word that means destroy.