Redeem the firstborn son
Verse: וכל בכור אדם בבניך תפדה
Command: Redeem the firstborn son.
Shemos 13:13
Type: Positive
SMG Mitzva # 144
Cross-Ref: {link}
SMG
It is written in the verse[i] קדש לי כל בכור פטר כל רחם בבני ישראל באדם ובבהמה לי הוא, and as it says [in the continuing verses[ii]] והעברת כל פטר רחם לה’ וכל פטר שגר בהמה אשר יהיה לך הזכרים לה’. And as it says [in the continuing verses[iii]] וכל בכור אדם בבניך תפדה. Later in the Torah, the verses[iv] say כל פטר רחם לכל בשר אשר יקריבו לה’ באדם ובבהמה יהיה לך, אך פדה תפדה את בכור האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה. ופדויו מבן חדש תפדה בערכך כסף חמשת שקלים בשקל הקדש עשרים גרה הוא. These verses prove that male children are sanctified with the firstborn status, but not daughters, as it says in the verse בבניך and [as specified[1]] הזכרים. We learnt in the Gemara[v] if the son passed away[2] within thirty (30) days, even if the redemption funds had been preemptively given to the Kohen, the Kohen should return the money – even if the child dies on the thirtieth day, it is as if he passed away on the previous day, and there is no obligation [to redeem the son]. Rabbi Akiva says [if the son passed away on the thirtieth (30th) day] it is a case of ספק and therefore, ‘one who seeks to expropriate funds from his friend must prove his claim’, like the law of a child who has a status[3] of being a ספק בכור. The Halaĉa though follows the sages [that there is no obligation to redeem a child who passed away on the thirtieth (30th) day]. And the Gemara there explains their reasoning, because they derive a גזירת שוה from the word חדש which is used both here and in the verse[vi] מבן חדש ומעלה.[4] And we learnt, one who redeems his son within the thirty (30) days [after his birth], Rav stated his son has been redeemed, and Shmuel said his son has not been redeemed. And the Gemara[vii] concludes, even though normally in a dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the Halaĉa follows Rav when it comes to prohibitive matter, here[5], the Halaĉa follows Shmuel.
the definition of פטר רחם
And a firstborn of the man, and not the woman, is not a firstborn for the Kohen.[6] However, a firstborn to a woman, even though he is not a firstborn to the man, is a firstborn for the Kohen.[7] Because, the verse made this dependent on פטר רחם. And the Halaĉa follows the sages who say there that a woman who miscarried a fetus that has the shape of a human, by which its mother becomes Tamay for having given birth [see positive Mitzva 243], children born thereafter are not firstborns for the Kohen, since the stillborn was the פטר רחם.
when does the obligation start
One who redeemed his son within thirty (30) days [of the child’s birth], even on the thirtieth (30th) day, if when doing so, the father stated ‘from now on’ then the son is not redeemed. If, however, the father stated ‘this takes effect after thirty (30) days [from the child’s birth]’ then his son is redeemed – even if the funds were used up during that time period.[8]
a [G-d forbid] unhealthy child
We learnt in the Gemara[viii] from the verse אך פדה תפדה את בכור האדם, you might think that if the child became נטרף within the thirty (30) days [from his birth, he might still be obligated to be redeemed], therefore the verse uses the term אך to differentiate. And we learnt in the Yerushalmi[ix], one who is נטרף is as if they have already died. The term נטרף means that signs of being unable to remain alive have developed [like an animal which had been mauled by a predator – a טריפה]. And the Gemara tells a story of a child who was born with two heads [a fully conjoined twin] – and anyone who has an extra is as if it is missing[9]. This does not follow the way Rabeinu Shlomo [Rashi] explained it, the נטרף means killed.
We learnt in the Gemara[x], [a woman] who has not previously had a firstborn son, who then gives birth to twin boys, they give [only] five (5) Sela to the Kohen. If one of them [the twins] dies within thirty (30) days, the father [parents] is exempt [from this obligation[10]]. [Similarly, a pair of dizygotic[11] twins, aka] a boy and a girl who are twins, [who were born together as firstborns, under that situation] the Kohen gets nothing. We learnt in the Gemara[xi] the Kohanim and Levi’im are exempt from redeeming their firstborn sons and from the obligation to redeem a firstborn donkey [positive Mitzva 145]. The reason is explained[xii] as being derived by fortiori, if they were able to redeem the Jews in the wilderness, then certainly they can redeem themselves. Rav Ada bar Ahava said[xiii] a Levite woman who gave birth to her son, is exempt from paying the five (5) Sela. And the Gemara concludes there, this applies even to a case where she was impregnated by a Yisroel[12], since the verse made the Mitzva dependent on פטר רחם.[13] We learnt in the Gemara[xiv] the five (5) Sela must be paid using [equivalent silver-value to] the coinage issued from Tyre. And we’ve already explained elsewhere [positive Mitzva 45 and 128] that the Ma’ah weight sixteen (16) average barleycorns. And in accordance with that measure we can determine the amount of the five (5) Sela of the child. We learnt in the Sifri based on the verse ופדויו מבן חדש תפדה is a general rule[14], כסף חמשת שקלים is a specific rule, and וכל בכור אדם בבניך תפדה is a general rule that was repeated. The rule [Rule #6] being כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט – just like the specific rule is explicit in that it refers to something tangible which has intrinsic value, [so too all items that fall within that category]. From here they said [the rule is] anything can be used to redeem the firstborn human, with the exception of slaves, promissory notes[15], and land.[16]
side discussion by the SMG on how the כלל ופרט וכלל rule works
The specific designation is the explanation of the [initial] generality. And therefore, within that general rule, nothing is designated save for that which was specified. And then, when the verse comes back and restates the later general rule, it is then adding, in general, anything similar to the specified rule. However, the rule of ריבה ומיעוט וריבה is a different concept. Because then the exclusory phrase of מיעוט does not explain the initial ריבה, but rather contracts it, so that we would not include anything other than that which is similar to the מיעוט similar to the rule of כלל ופרט וכלל.[17] And when the final ריבוי comes, it includes all things excluding one item which is most similar to the מיעוט.
items of questionable worth or questionable gifting
If the Kohen was given a token item [a Yarmulka], which was not worth five (5) Sela, and the Kohen stated, ‘this is worth five (5) Sela to me’ his son is thereby redeemed. Rav Ashi said, this applies only to a great person[18], who needs a token on his head[19]. But, for a different person, this would not work. And one who gives [the required payment] on condition that it be returned to him, his son is thereby redeemed[20], as was taught in the Gemara[xv].
who is obligated in this Mitzva
We’ve also explained there[xvi] that if the father violated this Mitzva, and did not redeem him, he himself [the firstborn son] must redeem himself [when he becomes an adult]. The woman [mother] is not obligated to redeem her son, as the verse states אך פדה תפדה – which implies that [can be read as] only the one who was redeemed has the obligation to redeem. A person who was conceived ‘not in holiness’[21] but was ‘born in holiness’ is obligated to redeem himself[22], as it says in the verse פטר רחם בישראל – and this one, [the child born to his converted mother] is the Jewish child who is firstborn to his mother.
what ברכה is recited
Elsewhere in the Gemara[xvii] we explained that the one who redeems his [firstborn] son recited the ברכה of:
ברוך אתה ה’ אלקינו מלך העולם אשר קידשנו במצותיו וצונו על פדיון הבן
And he recites the ברכה of שהחיינו – and thereafter gives the [items of value] which redeem his son to the Kohen. Therefore, if one redeems himself, he recites the ברכה with changed phrasing in addition to the ברכה of שהחיינו:
ברוך אתה ה’ אלקינו מלך העולם אשר קידשנו במצותיו וצונו על פדיון הבכור.
[1] In Hebrew, the term בנים or בניך means both children and sons. Unless specified as referring to male children, there is no way of knowing which term is intended. See Discussion on positive Mitzva 12 – the Mitzva to teach Torah to your children.
[2] See further on in the SMG regarding a child who died unnaturally during the thirty (30) day period. The SMG discounts Rashi’s interpretation that נטרף means killed. Instead, he accepts the Yerushalmi’s definition of נטרף as being a deformity that will cause the child to die eventually. Therefore, this would imply that for a perfectly healthy child, which was murdered within thirty (30) days of its birth, May G-d have mercy on us that such an occurrence should never happen, the parents might still be obligated to redeem the child, even though the child is not alive.
[3] For example, if twins were born, and those present do not know which child was born first.
[4] Just like in the verse counting the Levi’im, only children who were more than a month old were counted, so too here, the obligation to redeem is only when the son is more than a month old.
It is not clear to me from the SMG if this is derived by means of a גזירת שוה or by an understanding of the purpose of the Mitzva. Since the Mitzva to redeem the firstborn was initially applied only by exchanging Levi’im who were more than a month old with the firstborns of the Jewish people, that implies that the “more than” measurement is active in the application of this Mitzva, and no גזירת שוה is required. In other words, in establishing the first act of redeeming the firstborn, the Torah specified literally that only those a month old or higher were to be counted. Why would there be a need for a גזירת שוה when the Torah spells it out.
[5] Perhaps because, even though redeeming the firstborn is a ‘prohibitive matter’, there is a financial component – that of giving money to the Kohen. And in a dispute between Rav and Shmuel on financial matters, the Halaĉa follows Shmuel.
[6] Meaning, if this child is the first male child of the father, but the mother had previously given birth to a different child from a different father.
[7] Meaning, the father had fathered other children with other wives, but this is the firstborn of the child’s mother.
[8] Meaning even if the Kohen preemptively used the funds given for redemption before the child turned thirty (30) days old, nevertheless, the redemption has been performed – since, had the child passed away prior to the thirty (30) day mark, the Kohen would be obligated to return the funds. Therefore, even though the Kohen used the funds, he wasn’t entitled to what he was using until after the thirty (30) day mark.
This logic implies that the redemption is accomplished by the monetary value of that which was used to redeem the child. However, as the SMG will note further on, there is an obligation to give actual items of value, as is derived from the verse בערכך כסף חמשת שקלים which implies that the physical assets serve as the redemption, and not the financial value of the monetary transfer. While here, the Halaĉa states clearly that even if the physical assets no longer exist, the redemption has occurred. I do not know how to resolve this.
[9] For example, Down Syndrome is the result of an extra chromosome, which in effect is the same as if the chromosome was missing.
[10] Because it could be that it was the firstborn twin who passed away. And under the rule of המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה – whoever comes to expropriate from another must prove his claim, it is the Kohen’s obligation to prove he is entitled to payment, which he can’t do, as it could be the child that died was the firstborn.
We are obviously talking about a case where it is impossible to determine, for whatever reason, which of the children was born first.
[11] Male and female twins are called fraternal or dizygotic twins (derived from two separate eggs) because twins of opposite sexes cannot be identical. While two male twins can be either fraternal or identical, a boy-girl pair is always fraternal and results from two separate eggs fertilized by different sperm.
[12] Whose son is therefore not a Levite, as tribal affiliation follows the paternal line.
[13] And here, the רחם – womb is exempt.
I wonder if the Gemara means that the Torah established the criteria of the Mitzva as referring to the womb, and therefore, where the womb is exempt, so are the parents. Or, in the alternate, the Gemara is engaging in homiletical word play; פטר רחם literally means the exemption of the womb. In other words, the Torah defines the criteria of the Mitzva as being dependent on the mother, and simultaneously while doing so provides the wording which grants the exemption – that in the case where the womb is exempt, so too the child is exempt.
[14] the word פדויו – his redemption is undefined and could refer to any means of redemption. While כסף חמשת שקלים is defined as five (5) silver Shekel, while the final clause תפדה, which is in command form redeem, is also undefined.
The sages could presumably have derived their teaching from the excess verbiage employed by the verse but instead determined that the verbiage is in fact there to provide the כלל פרט כלל rule. Meaning, the first part of the verse defines the time frame – the child’s redemption [general] is at one (1) month old. The assessed amount for you being silver; five (5) Shekel [specific] of the holy Shekel currency. And all your firstborn sons you shall redeem [general]. Thus, the first כלל is actually there to provide the time frame. The middle פרט identifies how to perform the redemption. The final כלל issues the command to redeem. However, if we were to learn the verses in this manner, this would not provide us with the teaching that we know from the oral tradition, that most items of value can be used to redeem the child, so long as the value is equivalent to the required amount.
[15] Which is why paper currency is not usable, as such currency might be legal tender, but it has no intrinsic value. It’s just paper.
[16] The SMG now takes a moment to explain how this rule works as compared to the similar rule of ריבה מיעוט וריבה. The distinction between whether the Torah utilizes כלל ופרט וכלל or ריבה מיעוט וריבה is an unresolved debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael – and the Gemara in various locations analyzes the practical difference between which rule is being used.
[17] Meaning, at this point in the logical step process of ריבה ומיעוט וריבה, we arrive at the same conclusion as the entirety of the rule of כלל ופרט וכלל; namely, we include all items similar to the פרט. In other words, a ריבוי ומיעוט functions in the same way as a כלל ופרט וכלל. However, the ריבה ומיעוט וריבה rule takes this one step further.
[18] In the times of the Mishna and Gemara, it was not common for regular people to wear a Yarmulka on their head. In fact, a ירמולקה actually comes from the words ירא מלכא – fear of the king, as it denotes and engenders an awareness of the King, aka G-d, constantly.
[19] Meaning, we are not talking about sentimental value, but rather what the Kohen would actually be willing to pay, as he needs to item for his own purposes.
[20] My father told me, that when he gave the coins for my redemption to R’ Yaakov Tzvi HaKohen Roth Shelita, he did so intending to repurchase those coins back, at the going value of five ounces of silver, from him so that they could be used again if and when I myself had the Mitzva of the Redemption of the firstborn. And indeed, we had that Mitzva, and while I did not make the gift of the coins conditional, they were once again repurchased from the Kohen (R’ Tzvi HaKohen Seewald Shelita) so that my children might use them if they were to have the opportunity to perform this Mitzva.
[21] meaning, his parents were not Jewish when he was conceived, but the mother converted prior to his birth so that he was born Jewish – and the boy was the firstborn of the mother, in that she had no children prior to him while not Jewish.
[22] His father is not obligated to redeem him, since the father is not related to the son – even if the father converts, he is like [for this Mitzva at least] a newborn child and has no familial relationships. In the case where a married couple converts, they would need to remarry according to Halaĉa as he not even related to his wife after conversion.
While not obligated to do so, it seems to me that the convert father can do so anyway. As the rule is מזכין לאדם שלא בפניו – we can act in a person’s benefit even outside their presence. Here, when the child is a month old, the child is considered legally as incapable of acting on his own. However, the convert father who is now Jewish, should be theoretically allowed to provide the Kohen with the redemption funds. As to the concept of אך פדה תפדה – which sets the rule that only those redeemed are obligated to redeem, that seems to me a determination of obligation, and not a prohibition. Here, the Mitzva is not that the father should perform the redemption, but rather the Mitzva is passive – that the firstborn should be redeemed – in whatever manner that comes about. Whether the father or mother does so, or the child himself does so, so long as the Kohen has received the required redemption payment, why wouldn’t the child be redeemed thereby? Especially considering the obligations of treating a convert with extreme love etc. How can you tell him that he cannot redeem his firstborn son like all other Jewish children? Furthermore, the ברכה phrasing of על פדיון הבן vs. לפדות את הבן implies that the Mitzva is passive, and not directly attributable to the father.
[i] Shemos 13:2
[ii] Shemos 13:12
[iii] Shemos 13:13
[iv] Bamidbar 18:15-16
[v] Gem. Beĉoros 49a
[vi] Presumably Bamidbar 3:40 and
[vii] Gem. Beĉoros 49b
[viii] Gem. Perek Hakometz Rabba 37a and Bava Kama 11b
[ix] Yer. Kiddushin 1:4
[x] Gem. Beĉoros 48a
[xi] Gem. Beĉoros 13a
[xii] Gem. Beĉoros 4a
[xiii] Gem. Beĉoros 47a
[xiv] Gem. Beĉoros 49b
[xv] Gem. Kiddushin 6b
[xvi] Gem. Beĉoros 29a
[xvii] Gem. Pesaĉim 121b
AMUDAY SHLOMO
[The Maharshal does not have any commentary on this Mitzva. The Amuday Shlomo manuscript was incomplete.]
RASHI
Rashi provides only a single comment on these verses as follows:
- וכל בכור אדם בבניך תפדה – five (5) Sela, the redemption [price] was set elsewhere [presumably in the verses in Bamidbar 18:15-16].
Rashi does not provide a comment on the verses which set forth the gift of the firstborn children to the Kohanim, nor the price of their redemption.
On the verses which describe the initial redemption of the firstborn by means of their exchange with the Levi’im of which there were excess firstborn who did not have a Levi to exchange themselves with, the redemption price there was also set at five (5) Sela. Rashi comments on the verse[i] ואת פדויי השלש וכו’ – that the price of the sale of Yosef, who was the firstborn of Raĉel had been set at twenty (20) pieces of silver,[ii] which is equivalent to five (5) Sela.
Additionally, on the verse[iii] פקד כל בכר זכר מבן חדש ומעלה – Rashi explains that this time frame was provided since at that point, they [the firstborn children] have graduated from the status of possible premature birth.
As for the concept that firstborn children need to be redeemed, Rashi provides that explanation on the verse[iv] מתוך בני ישראל – so that the Jewish people will hire them to provide my service. By means of the firstborn I [G-d] have established my Rights in them [the Levi’im] and I [G-d] have taken them [the Levi’im] in exchange [of the firstborn]. Because the Service had been performed by the firstborn. And when they sinned with the [golden] calf, they were rendered unfit [for serving G-d[1]]. And the Levi’im who did not serve idolatry were chosen their stead.[v]
[1] The Halaĉa is, once a Kohen [whether from the Tribe of Levi or a firstborn] has served idolatry, he is rendered unfit thereafter for service to G-d. See Melaĉim II 23:9 אך לא יעלו כהני הבמות אל מזבח ה’ בירושלים, which talks about the prohibition of Kohanim who served on forbidden altars to G-d as being prohibited from serving in the Base Hamikdash – even though those altars were not for idolatrous purposes.
[i] Bamidbar 3:46
[ii] See Beraishis Rabba 84:18
[iii] Bamidbar 3:40
[iv] Bamidbar 3:12
[v] See Gem. Zevaĉim 112
Discussion by SMS
We find a narrative in the Gemara[i] regarding the census of the Levi’im in Parshas Bamidbar. A non-Jewish king once looked at the math in our Parsha and accused Moshe Rabbeinu of being either a liar or a thief.
The Torah[ii] provides the count of the Levi’im as twenty-two thousand (22,000). But if you tally up the individual families of Gershon[iii] seven thousand five hundred (7,500), Kehos[iv] eight thousand six hundred (8,600), and Merari[v] six thousand two hundred (6,200), the total number [excluding Aharon[vi] himself of course] is actually twenty-two thousand three hundred (22,300). Where did those three hundred (300) Levi’im go?
Rashi provides the answer: Those three hundred (300) were themselves firstborn – the firstborn Levi’im. Even though they were counted in the family census, they were excluded from the total count used to redeem the firstborns of Israel because they were needed to “redeem themselves.”
This raises a fascinating logical[1] dilemma: If the Levi’im are already inherently sanctified, why do they need personal redemption at all? Furthermore, the original redemption in the wilderness was a one-to-one exchange—one Levi for one firstborn Israelite. Today, however, the Mitzvah of Pidyon Haben is given to the Kohanim (not the Levi’im), and we only use five (5) silver coins instead of the Levi / Kohen himself, and it is perfectly allowed to have one Kohen redeem innumerable firstborns.
What changed.
This initial mass-redemption was a one-time anomaly. G-d took the existing firstborns of Israel and swapped them head-for-head with the Levi’im. But if this system was meant to be the method by which the future Mitzva would be performed, this could create a logistical problem. Each family with a firstborn would have to seek out a Levi, one who had not previously been exchanged with a firstborn, then conduct the redemption. If they couldn’t find one, each firstborn would have to wait until one was born (or came in from someplace else).
Accordingly, the Gemara[vii] notes a discussion between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoĉanan as to whether the Mitzva was even operative prior to the Jewish people’s entry to the land of Israel.
- Based on the verse[viii] והיה כי יביאך, Reish Lakish takes the position that firstborns born in the wilderness were not sanctified. Aside from this one-time swap, this Mitzva was not performed.
- Rabbi Yoĉanan disagrees[2] with the classification of the verse as a condition of the Mitzva. Rather, he views it as a promise, that the Jewish people will indeed enter the land of Israel – in the merit of performing this Mitzva.
According to both opinions though, the current Mitzva of Redeeming the firstborn is not the way it was performed the first time. Why was it performed differently? The answer lies not in the nature of the firstborn, but in the evolving status of the Levi’im and Kohanim.
Initially, the Kohanim were simply a specialized branch of the Levi’im. Their job, as one of the families of the Tribe of Levi, was to act as the “honor guard” of the Mishkan. Because all branches of Levi were essentially equivalent servants of G-d – as were the firstborns who had previously been the ones offering sacrifices on behalf of the people[3], a direct, one-to-one exchange between a firstborn Israelite and a Levi was the proper method of redemption.
However, the rebellion of Koraĉ(the Levi) changed the spiritual landscape forever. Koraĉ demanded that all the Jews are equal. And indeed, he was right. Any Levi could be exchanged for any firstborn. There was no premier status amongst Levi’im. G-d changed that by elevating the Kohanim above their baseline honor guard position, granting them twenty-four (24) specific gifts—including the right to the firstborn redemption.
Because of this elevation, a Kohen is no longer on a one-to-one par with a standard firstborn, just like a Kohen is no longer on par with a standard member of the Tribe of Levi. The firstborn might be inherently greater than his brothers, but the Kohen is now the Chosen Servants of G-d.
This elevated status is exactly what allows a single Kohen to redeem countless firstborns using mundane assets which can be used over and over again. The original parameters of the Mitzvah shifted entirely because of Koraĉ.[4]
[Presumably this is also the source as to how and why there is a prophecy that in the future Kohanim will be elevated even further etc. Once the precedent is set by G-d, it becomes a reality that can be actualized.]
[1] And a Halaĉic dilemma. The SMG quotes the Gemara [Beĉoros 4a] which teaches us that Kohanim and Levi’im are not obligated to redeem their firstborn children by use of the fortiori rule: If a Levi could redeem others, certainly he can redeem himself. However, this comment by Rashi implies the opposite. It is only because the Torah excluded the firstborn Levi’im from the general total that we learn they were not to be used to redeem a firstborn – that they could in fact redeem themselves. Without that exclusion during the census, Moshe would have included them in the total, as he in fact included them in the individual family censuses.
[2] Generally speaking, in arguments between Rabbi Yoĉanan and Reish Lakish, the Halaĉa follows Rabbi Yoĉanan. However, since Reish Lakish advanced an unquestioned view that this one-time swap was an anomaly, we can certainly take that position for the purposes of this discussion.
[3] Who had previously been offering sacrifices to G-d on behalf of their families – as it says in the verse [Shemos 24:5] וישלחו את נערי בני ישראל ויעלו עלת, ויזבחו זבחים שלמים לה’ פרים, on which Rashi comments, these את נערי were the firstborns.
[4] However, the status of the Levi’im and the firstborn were not decreased. They remain on par – which is why, when a Levi is not present to wash the hands of the Kohanim prior to their service, a firstborn, who is on par with a Levi, should do so. They still contain that inherent greatness equivalent to a Levi. [See positive Mitzva 19]
[i] Gem. Beĉoros 5a
[ii] Bamidbar 3:39
[iii] Bamidbar 3:22
[iv] Bamidbar 3:28
[v] Bamidbar 3:34
[vi] See Rashi explaining why Aharon’s name has dots on top of it.
[vii] Gem. Beĉoros 4b
[viii] Shemos 13:11-12